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Cuban missile crisis**

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PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT: HAROLD MACMILLAN'S ACCOUNTS OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS¹

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In October 1962 Harold Macmillan had been Prime Minister for nearly six years and been keeping a regular diary since 1950. His contemporaneous scrawled diary references to what was described therein as ‘the World Crisis’ became the first account Macmillan provided of the Cuban stand-off. On 4 November 1962, with the high-point of the crisis seemingly passed during the previous weekend, Macmillan then provided a second account, a lengthy entry in which he tried to order his thoughts on the causes, resolution and consequences of the Cuban missile crisis.² This was reproduced almost *in toto* at the close of the chapter, ‘On the Brink’, about Cuba in the sixth and last volume of his memoirs, *At the End of the Day*. This, covering the period 1961-1963, was published on 26 September 1973 in Britain and on 9 January 1974 in the US. Highlights from the memoirs were serialised before the publication of each volume in the *Sunday Times*. Publication was also marked by a televised interview with Macmillan, with the relevant section on Cuba being broadcast on BBC1 at 9.25pm on 19 September 1973. As well as a radio version, this programme was repeated on 27 October 1974 and again, following Macmillan’s death in 1986, in January 1987. Furthermore, an edited transcript appeared in the BBC’s *The Listener* magazine.³ Macmillan thus retold his version of the Cuban missile crisis – and other aspects of his career – many times, in a wide range of media. In the process he also, as the BBC head of Current Affairs, John Grist, observed of an earlier broadcast interview, ‘polished the words of his stories’.⁴ The result was that, particularly for British audiences, Macmillan’s successive accounts helped to shape public understandings of the Cuban missile crisis.

At the time of the Cuban missile crisis Macmillan was 68 and by the time his memoir of that episode appeared he was nearing his eightieth birthday. As the broadcast made clear, he nevertheless remained mentally robust, returning to manage the family publishing firm after his health-induced retirement from the Premiership in 1963.⁵ This helps to explain how the autobiography of ‘Mr Harold’ eventually ran to 3,763 pages and some 1.5 million words.

Macmillan significantly chose to start work on the memoirs on 4 August 1964, the fiftieth anniversary of the most traumatic experience of his life, the outbreak of the Great War. He set out deliberately to reflect on the dramatic changes, not least the decline of Europe and the rise of the rival empires of the Americans and the Soviets who confronted each other over Cuba, which ensued from that disaster. In the process he deliberately modelled himself on the multi-volume memoirs of his great mentor and predecessor, Winston Churchill.⁶

The work was financed by the contract for £360,000 signed between the book trust Macmillan established as the owner of his literary estate and the Thomson Organisation, including serial rights in the *Sunday Times*, ‘of which £34,000 is to be paid to me in 4 annual instalments to write the book and pay the assistants etc’.⁷ Thomson in turn contracted the

American rights with Harper & Row, while the book contract with the family firm of Macmillan & Company for the rest of the world was seemingly a more modest £45,000.⁸

Whilst Prime Minister Macmillan had prepared for the eventual memoirs by again copying Churchill, in this case by taking away duplicates of all possible documents for his private archive.⁹ Ironically, in doing so Macmillan directly contravened his own guidelines on the writing of ministerial memoirs laid down in the Cabinet memorandum in 1961:

I attach particular importance to the point....that special difficulty arises over memoirs which are constructed on the basis of official documents and keep closely to the wording of these documents, whether by quotation or by paraphrase. For this as well as for other reasons it is specially desirable that Ministers should not retain official documents in their private possession on relinquishing office....I hope that, when the times comes, all my colleagues will be careful to comply with this rule.¹⁰

He also went through the million words of his diaries selecting passages to be transcribed for possible inclusion by his two secretarial assistants, who were at this stage in this process Anne Macpherson and Bunty Morley. For instance, just over 70 per cent of the diaries for 1962 were selected for transcription in this way. These voluminous materials, supplemented by books and correspondence, were piled high in the old billiard room in Birch Grove, Macmillan's country house in Sussex. At the end of 1964 Anne Glyn-Jones arrived as his archivist and was told to 'browse about a bit' through these piles. This she did, producing folders of material relevant to each chapter. From the third volume onwards she also organised into thematic chapters the structure of each instalment of the memoirs.¹¹

When Glyn-Jones came to sorting the material for 'On the Brink', the diary entries from ten years earlier were mainly of use for the opening days of the crisis. Macmillan padded these out with messages from Kennedy and the British ambassador to Washington, David Ormsby-Gore, and particularly with transcripts from the telephone conversations he had with Kennedy during the crisis. This, as was no doubt intended, gives the feeling of a blow-by-blow account by a closely-involved participant. The relative paucity of diary entries and the alternative material selected also inevitably privileged Prime Minister-Presidential relations. Only a close reading of the chapter reveals how important other dimensions of the crisis – such as the role of the United Nations [UN] – were to the Prime Minister at the time. The repeated references to the Acting Secretary-General U Thant,¹² for instance, are subsumed within this dialogue with Kennedy.

U Thant was also relatively overlooked in Macmillan's contemporary diary entries. The first reference to the Cuban missile crisis in the diaries is to the message received from President Kennedy at Chequers at 10pm on Sunday 21 October 1962, warning of the Soviet build-up, though in 'On the Brink' he refers obliquely to the guarded indications given to British intelligence officials in Washington two days before.¹³ At the time he wrote the chapter he was not aware of the extensive debates raging in Kennedy's specially-convened Executive Committee (ExComm) since 16 October. 'On the Brink' nevertheless begins with Macmillan's view of the origins of the crisis from Castro's seizure of power in Cuba in 1959. He does not recapitulate the critical comments about American policy towards this new regime in his diaries from 1960, though 'On the Brink' does reproduce the scepticism he expressed to then President Eisenhower about the likely efficacy of sanctions against the Cubans.¹⁴ The chapter then jumps to the start of the crisis, passing over episodes like the Bay of Pigs in silence. Macmillan had been aware of planning for this attempt to overthrow Castro aided by the Americans, but never considered it likely to succeed.

Nor were the British inclined to share the Administration's anxiety to lance the Cuban boil, or the methods they selected to do so. One of Macmillan's constant refrains was the need for trade expansion, not least as a means of tying-in countries to the West. The embargo of all trade with Cuba except medical supplies announced by Kennedy on 3 February 1962 was a step in the opposite direction and unwelcome in London. Sanctions were seen as slow and ineffective. The British had previously refused Castro's request for jet fighters under American pressure. However, Kennedy's urging of British support for the embargo to Lord Home, the British Foreign Secretary, during the latter's Washington visit in late September 1962, as the President moved towards difficult mid-term elections, met with observations that British shipping interests could only be coerced by new legislation difficult to justify in peacetime. Macmillan concluded therefore in a note to Home of 1 October, 'there is no reason for us to help the Americans on Cuba'.¹⁵ Such interventions, as the Minister of State at the Foreign Office, Joseph Godber, pointed out would 'merely force Castro to depend more and more completely on the Soviet Union'.¹⁶ Indeed, it appears that a combination of US trade pressure and military exercises suggesting imminent invasion of Cuba helped, as this view might have predicted, to create the circumstances in which the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, decided in May 1962 to send missiles to Castro.¹⁷

Macmillan, however, does not appear to have suspected this either in his diary entry of 4 November 1962, or at the time of writing 'On the Brink'. Instead, he speculated that Khrushchev's motive was to threaten the embattled outpost of West Berlin. Indeed, his only diary reference in 1962 to Cuba prior to the outbreak of the crisis was, in noting on Home's return from Washington his objections to a trade embargo that 'The Russians are clearly using Cuba as a counter-irritant to Berlin'.¹⁸ Nor did Macmillan note at the time or subsequently the growing pressure on Kennedy from senior Republicans, particularly Senator Kenneth Keating, claiming that the Soviets were deploying missiles in Cuba,¹⁹ even though he hints that British intelligence also suggested a build-up of some kind there.²⁰

Keating's claim was publicly denied by Kennedy on 4 September 1962. Nevertheless, from August the President began to receive daily intelligence reports on Cuba. Conclusive proof both of missiles and Il-28 bombers being assembled was finally provided by an U2 over-flight on 14 October and presented to the President in Washington at 8.45am on 16 October. Thereafter Kennedy's hastily-convened Executive Committee (ExComm) debated what to do, but neither Ormsby-Gore nor David Bruce, the US ambassador to London, were officially told of the crisis until 21 October,²¹ earlier in the day than Macmillan.

Apparently Kennedy decided initially not to consult the British because he felt 'They'll just object' to the idea of a military response. There was agreement in ExComm that Macmillan and President de Gaulle of France should be given 24 hours' notice of action.²² However, the Americans only moved to informing their allies of the crisis as their thinking shifted instead to a limited naval blockade,²³ to commence on 24 October. Nevertheless, Macmillan's reaction to Kennedy in their first telephone conversation of the crisis late on 22 October – only briefly mentioned in 'On the Brink'²⁴ – was very similar to Kennedy's own a week earlier, arguing that the President ought 'to seize Cuba and have done with it'.²⁵ In contrast, Macmillan was doubtful both about a blockade's legality and its speedily achieving its objectives; in which case Kennedy might find that 'he may never get rid of Cuban rockets except by trading them for Turkish, Italian or other bases'. Indeed, early in that conversation he asked 'What are you going to do with the blockade? Are you going to occupy Cuba and have done with it or is it going to just drag on?' Kennedy, however, did not want to pursue that option because it 'invites [Khrushchev] so directly into Berlin'. Furthermore, such action

would require seven days to mobilise.²⁶ What it did not require was a similar build-up of NATO forces, with resulting public alarm. Macmillan therefore, as he recounts in ‘On the Brink’ rebuffed hints from Washington of the need for heightened alert levels.²⁷

Apart from mentioning ‘certain precautions affecting the Royal Air Force’ Macmillan had nothing further to say on the subject therein.²⁸ This was consistent with and carried into his memoirs his contemporary concern to avoid alarming the public. At the time the Prime Minister made clear to Bomber Command, responsible for the nuclear-armed V-force bombers, the need therefore to eschew any overt preparations. There was accordingly no reference in Macmillan’s memoirs to the shift on the morning of 27 October from Alert Condition 4 (with one crew at 15 minutes readiness) to Alert Condition 3, with six and then 12 aircraft at this level of preparedness. He was himself probably unaware that the entire force of some 120 bombers was then placed on cockpit readiness, within five minutes of take-off, for much of that afternoon.²⁹ Alert Condition 3 remained in place until 5 November.

There may be a further reason for Macmillan’s reticence on this subject. He had taken the view when Foreign Secretary in 1955 that nuclear weapons had abolished war.³⁰ No doubt he was unwilling to emphasize in ‘On the Brink’ how close he came to being proved wrong on this, or the extent of his personal responsibility for preparations which would have eclipsed in their outcome even the hideousness of the Great War. His ongoing drive to negotiate a ban on nuclear tests, which Bruce saw as almost an obsession, was similarly shaped by his acute awareness of global anxieties about the military and environmental threats posed by these new and horrific weapons.

Macmillan’s concern for speedy action reflected the same concern to manage public opinion, not just in Britain but around the world. His fear was that otherwise demand for a peace conference could grow, fed by European public opinion sceptical about being brought to the brink of nuclear war by Americans now having to live, as they themselves had long done, under the Russian nuclear shadow.³¹ As he told Kennedy in the early hours of 23 October, ‘if we are forced to a conference all the cards are in this man’s hands’.³² Indeed, Macmillan’s notes in preparation for this conversation include the observation ‘If you aim at a conference would it not be better to have a fait accompli first?’³³

Macmillan’s views on the risks involved in a conference can seem inconsistent with his previous record on the subject. After all, he was an inveterate enthusiast for a renewal of the East-West conversations he had participated in as Foreign Secretary in 1955, which he had tried to revive in the run-up to the abortive Paris summit of 1960.³⁴ Some kind of conference was therefore naturally at the forefront of his mind early in the crisis. The question was, however, what outcome could be expected from such an event? After all, as Macmillan noted to Ormsby-Gore on 22 October, such an event would provide a perfect opportunity for the Soviets to broach issues like Berlin, which the British were keen not to entangle in the Cuban crisis. This risk, and the chance that such an event would be used to ‘endanger the unity of the [NATO] Alliance’, was also very much the theme of the Prime Minister’s remarks to the first Cabinet meeting of the crisis on 23 October.³⁵ A conference was therefore to be seen as a last resort option. The Prime Minister made it clear that ‘I could not allow a situation in Europe or in the world to develop which looks like escalating into war without trying some action by calling a conference on my own’, but this was for the ambassador’s ‘personal information only’. It proved unnecessary to pursue this option. Accordingly, this particular passage was not included in the extensive extract from this telegram to Ormsby-Gore reproduced in ‘On the Brink’.³⁶ Nor was Macmillan’s brief revival of the idea of some kind

of limited summit later on 27 October when he feared the crisis was heading towards conflict.³⁷

On the other hand, a conference which enabled progress on more general disarmament issues, not least on Macmillan's aspirations for a test ban, could certainly be desirable, if feasible. Whether the Americans might support such an idea for a general conference, with Cuba as a preliminary, was therefore raised by Home with Ormsby-Gore on 24 October. The ambassador, however, decided not to raise this with the President. It did not accord with how the Administration was trying to present the crisis: as the ambassador noted, 'for the Americans this is a clear challenge by the Soviet Union and....Castro is a mere cypher in the game'. Home's idea was therefore a non-starter;³⁸ thereafter discussion of a conference dropped from British contributions to the crisis. Nor, apart from brief and isolated references (for instance on p.212), does it feature in 'On the Brink'.

The risks of being pushed into talks from which the Soviets would be the main beneficiaries were made apparent by the groups who, in the early stages of the crisis, called for such a conference. These included the non-aligned countries supporting the Ghana/United Arab Republic (Egypt) resolution to the United Nations Security Council on 24 October. This, and the accompanying calls for an international conference from President Nkrumah of Ghana, risked presenting the crisis as occasioned by the American quarantine, rather than the placing of Soviet missiles on Cuba. A conference on such terms was clearly attractive to the Soviets; the Polish ambassador inviting himself to visit Home at the Foreign Office on the morning of 24 October to present a suggestion along these lines. He was firmly rebuffed by the Foreign Secretary, well aware that attention should be focused instead upon the missiles already in place on the island.³⁹ Talks along these lines were fraught with dangers.

This was made further apparent when U Thant, under non-aligned pressure, despatched to Kennedy and Khrushchev messages on the afternoon (New York time) of 24 October, calling for a standstill in both Soviet shipments and the quarantine pending talks. While Macmillan made no mention in 'On the Brink' of the Ghanaian or Polish initiatives, he made clear therein his doubts about U Thant's intervention, recording his comments in his telephone call with Kennedy that evening that 'I think that's rather tiresome of him because it looks sensible and yet it's very bad'. It was bad because, as Kennedy had just noted, it distracted from the American goal of removing the missile sites, on which work was steadily continuing.⁴⁰ It was also, as Macmillan noted in his diary, that 'Now that [the] Russians have been proved blatant liars, no unpoliced agreement with them is possible'.⁴¹

This meant that proof of Soviet duplicity had to be provided, not least for the benefit of the British public and sceptical opinions, particularly in the non-aligned world. As Macmillan notes in 'On the Brink', his reaction to the photographic evidence of the missile sites Bruce showed him on 22 October was that they had to be widely publicized with expert interpretation. British pressure and Bruce's support led to sanitized versions of the pictures being released in London on 23 October. Macmillan in 'On the Brink' incorrectly claims that these photographs were first publicized at the Security Council on that day. There is no doubt that their presentation there by the US ambassador, Adlai Stevenson, was one of the most theatrical moments of the crisis. However, it did not happen until two days later and again was almost certainly with British encouragement.⁴²

Meanwhile, on 23 October, Macmillan met with a Labour delegation who asked if he would go to Washington,⁴³ as Attlee had done at a similar juncture during the Korean War. Though he raised this possibility with Kennedy the following evening, in his diary the Prime Minister

merely noted ‘They hadn’t much to say’.⁴⁴ Nor did his diary entry refer to the related problems of managing the press and public opinion, despite a note from his private secretary, Tim Bligh, warning that lobby correspondents were asking if Britain had been consulted on the developing crisis.⁴⁵ Such material does not appear to have been the bundles taken from Downing Street amongst which Glyn-Jones ferretted out the background information for this chapter. Macmillan did nevertheless meet with the lobby correspondents on the evening of 25 October, noting ‘The consumption of alcoholic refreshment was extraordinary’.⁴⁶

Meanwhile, on 24 October at 2.00pm (Greenwich Mean Time [GMT]), the quarantine around Cuba came into force. At around 11.30pm⁴⁷ (British Summer Time [BST]) that evening Macmillan again spoke to Kennedy. Apart from the U Thant proposals and Kennedy’s concern to make sure Macmillan had the arguments needed to counter the Opposition in the Commons debate scheduled for the following day,⁴⁸ the main item was a question from Kennedy on whether or not, if work continued on the missiles ‘Do we then tell them that if they don’t get the missiles out, that we’re going to invade Cuba?’ Notwithstanding his earlier belligerence, Macmillan now asked for time to think about this. Kennedy had confirmed early in the conversation that some Soviet ships had turned around. This, U Thant’s intervention and the soft answer Khrushchev gave to the Acting Secretary-General, led the Prime Minister to conclude in his response, sent on 25 October and reproduced in ‘On the Brink’, that ‘events have gone too far’.⁴⁹ Macmillan may have been an ardent anti-appeaser in the 1930s. Now, however, he felt UN inspection of the sites to ensure their immobilisation would remove the threat posed by the missiles, without the need for military action.

It is not clear at what time this document was despatched, but a hand-written note by Macmillan’s foreign policy private secretary, Philip de Zulueta, suggests that it was at 10.25am (BST).⁵⁰ This idea of immobilisation, however, hardly featured when Kennedy and Macmillan had their third conversation of the crisis after 11.00pm (BST) on 25 October.⁵¹ Macmillan briefly raised it as the main objective of the Americans, but the President concentrated on naval aspects of the crisis. The Americans, however, were well-aware of the significance of the missiles already on the island, knowing as they did that the Soviets were still pushing on apace with the bases under construction on Cuba. Accordingly, Kennedy observed to ExComm the following morning (26 October) – confirmed to Macmillan that evening – that additional action was needed to remove these weapons.⁵² Forceful removal was the option stressed to the British, French and West German ambassadors in Washington that evening. At the same meeting the ambassadors were told the American estimation that the Soviets had intended a showdown over Berlin on completion of the Cuban bases, to coincide with Khrushchev’s upcoming visit to the US.⁵³ That, of course, depended on completion without detection, no longer a possibility. Khrushchev also plainly failed to consult his ambassadors in Washington or at the UN in New York either about the missile deployment or the likely American reaction. Towards the end of the crisis Britain’s ambassador to the Soviet Union, Sir Frank Roberts, acutely recalled ‘Khrushchev’s well-known proclivity for setting out courses of action without knowing where they could lead him, coupled with his undoubted talent for making the best of the resulting situation’.⁵⁴ Whether his improvisation on 26 October turned out best for him is another matter. This consisted of a first letter in which Khrushchev suggested to Kennedy the possibility of dismantling the missiles in Cuba, in return for a guarantee that Cuba would not be invaded, tightened in a second message (on 27 October) by linkage with the *quid pro quo* of American withdrawal of ‘analogous weapons’ such as the 15 Jupiter Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) installed in Turkey in 1961.

Neither Macmillan nor Kennedy was aware of this when they spoke for the fourth time during the crisis at 11.15pm (BST) on 26 October,⁵⁵ though the latter mentioned some unofficial hints along similar lines from Russian officials. The President had in fact conceded the merits of such a guarantee for Cuba in ExComm earlier that day. Macmillan was not made aware of this, or of the way in which the Americans intended to use the Brazilians to float this idea.⁵⁶ Such a possibility, however, clearly piqued the Prime Minister's interest.⁵⁷ He then returned to the idea of a UN inspection team to 'ensure that these missiles were made inoperable during the period of any conference or discussion', suggesting that it be led by U Thant, before dropping into the conversation his own swop proposal, the immobilisation of the 60 Thor IRBMs deployed in Britain in 1958-59.⁵⁸ This would have been a significant gesture as normally 65 per cent of this force (39 missiles) was on 30 minutes readiness. Indeed, at 11.00am on 27 October (BST) the Prime Minister agreed a move to Alert Condition 3 for Bomber Command, which meant that 59 of the Thors were at 15 minutes readiness, remaining so until 5 November.⁵⁹ None of this, however, was mentioned at the time in Macmillan's diary, and it was only obliquely referred to in 'On the Brink'. Similarly, the fact that, despite the President's non-committal response, particularly to the Thor swop, these three schemes were then reiterated in a message to Kennedy in the early hours of 27 October (BST) was also passed over in silence.⁶⁰

There are, indeed, no diary entries at all for Saturday 27 October. Macmillan and Home had cancelled all their weekend engagements.⁶¹ From the diary of Macmillan's press secretary, Harold Evans, it is clear that the day was spent in great anxiety that Kennedy might have decided that there was no other way and 'was hell-bent on destroying the missile sites. This carried the strong possibility of Soviet retaliation in Berlin or elsewhere, with the prospect of escalation into nuclear war'. In these circumstances, Macmillan 'felt he must intervene' in ways which would achieve the immobilisation of the weapons without resort to US military action.⁶² These anxieties would not have been assuaged by Ormsby-Gore's telegram received at 4.00am that morning. Reporting the meeting with Secretary of State Dean Rusk and his fellow ambassadors from France and West Germany the previous evening (Washington time) he noted that the Secretary of State, 'When asked what further action the United States might take if they failed to obtain a satisfactory outcome in the talks with U Thant, he indicated that they would have to consider destroying the sites by bombing'. At least Rusk confirmed that the three principal European allies would be consulted before any such eventuality occurred.⁶³

On 27 October ExComm began to meet at around 10.00am Washington time, by which time it was already 3.00pm in London. For Macmillan much of the day had passed. It is therefore difficult to endorse the claim of scholars such as May and Zelikow that both Macmillan and Ormsby-Gore became *de facto* members of ExComm during the crisis.⁶⁴ The fact that neither was physically present, and that Macmillan sometimes only received limited reports on what was transpiring in Washington from Ormsby-Gore and often had to wait for hours for detailed telegrams to come through necessarily limited his direct knowledge of events across the Atlantic. One example is the news of the shooting down of the American U2 surveillance aeroplane over Cuba, which very much exercised ExComm on the afternoon of 27 October.⁶⁵ Macmillan talked in some detail about this incident in his BBC interview in 1973. At the time, however, he was only belatedly apprised of it.⁶⁶ A telegram from the British embassy in Cuba bearing this news did not arrive until in London 6.38am on 28 October, having seemingly been nine hours in transmission.⁶⁷ Another example is that, in the ExComm discussions early on 27 October, the text arrived of Khrushchev's second message to Kennedy. In contrast, the copy of this message in the Prime Minister's files is from the news agency Reuters, a transcript of the broadcast on Radio Moscow.

Home's hand-written notes on the British copy of this message observed that the build-up goes on – a point made by Kennedy in his noon (Washington time) broadcast – whilst the US had rejected the Turkey linkage. Home's comments ended, 'Still trying to keep it to this [Western] hemisphere'.⁶⁸ This kind of language no doubt reflected British attempts to respond to American sensitivities, tutored by the 1823 Monroe doctrine, about outside interference in their part of the world.

It is not clear when Home made these notes. However, it is apparent from the despatch Home sent to Britain's ambassador to the UN, Sir Patrick Dean, at 3pm (London time) that day that various British schemes for UN involvement in immobilisation were indeed designed to keep the issue in the Western hemisphere, avoiding 'reciprocity in the European area'. Home's suggestions therefore focused on U Thant leading an inspection team to Cuba, Cuban inviolability and/or of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America. The reciprocity in the European area that the Thor offer undoubtedly constituted was additional, something to be used 'if it would make all the difference'.⁶⁹ A telegram sent to the Washington embassy at 2.30pm asked that Rusk also be informed of these instructions.⁷⁰

It was not until 8.07pm on 27 October that Kennedy's response to Macmillan's memorandum of their previous evening's conversation arrived in London. This message is not mentioned in Harold Evans' diary, but it seems to have been the cause of the anxiety he noted. It gave Kennedy's reaction to Khrushchev's broadcast, concluding:

This morning I authorised a release restating our position that work on the Cuban bases, which is still continuing, must stop before we can consider other proposals.

I do not feel that this country should allow itself to become engaged in negotiations affecting the individual security interests of our NATO allies. Any initiatives in this respect, it seems to me, should appropriately come from Europe.

I would appreciate your views on the current situation as it develops. In the meantime, I continue to believe that we must secure the actual dismantling of the missiles currently in Cuba as the first order of business.⁷¹

In his response – seemingly despatched an hour or so later following discussions with Home, Rab Butler, Ted Heath, Peter Thorneycroft and the permanent under-secretary at the Foreign Office (and former ambassador to the US) Sir Harold Caccia⁷² – Macmillan immediately indicated 'I am in full agreement with your last two paragraphs'. In particular, the penultimate paragraph was interpreted as an invitation for an initiative along the lines already broached with the President. The Prime Minister accordingly put forward a draft message to be sent to Khrushchev suggesting a standstill for negotiations during which:

1. The Soviet Government would agree to:-
 - (a) No further work on the missile sites in Cuba;
 - (b) No imports of ballistic missiles into the island;
 - (c) The existing missiles in Cuba being made inoperable (which can be done without any breach of military security).

All this under U.N. authority.

2. At the same time the U.S. Government would agree to:-
 - (a) Lift the quarantine, and
 - (b) Not take any physical action against Cuba during the standstill.

In a final paragraph the Thor offer was then reiterated.⁷³

Seemingly it was not until after this point that a telegram from Dean arrived at 9.31pm (BST) indicating U Thant's response to Home's proposals. Dean reported that in the conversation he had with U Thant at 1.00pm (New York time), it was clear that the idea of following in the footsteps of his late predecessor, Dag Hammarskjöld, and actually going into the field to address problems had not occurred to the Acting UN Secretary-General. U Thant, however, considered the idea of leading an inspection team, but treated it as separate from issues such as Turkey or the inviolability of Cuba.

Dean did not pass on to his American counterparts the Thor offer idea.⁷⁴ From his telegram received at 11.22pm (BST) it is not clear whether Ormsby-Gore mentioned this to the President either when he saw him that morning (Washington time). The only part of the British proposals the President appears to have responded to, from this account, is the U Thant mission idea, which Kennedy said 'could be a useful initiative', depending on timing. The rest of Ormsby-Gore's telegram was taken up with how the Americans were responding to the Khrushchev broadcast and with Kennedy's thoughts about Turkey. The President's view was reported as 'that there was little military value to be attached to the missiles in Turkey'. The issue was how the Turks would react.⁷⁵

The Turkish ambassador to the UN made his government's displeasure apparent to Stevenson at a meeting on the evening of 27 October.⁷⁶ ExComm had meanwhile been discussing how the Americans should react to Khrushchev's linkage of Cuba and Turkey for much of the day. From a military perspective, the issue was largely symbolic. As Robert McNamara, the US Secretary of Defense pointed out, the Jupiters in Turkey were 'more obsolete than the Thor missile. The British have recognised the obsolescence of the Thor and have decided to take it out and replace it with other systems'. Clearly, as Under-Secretary of State George Ball noted, similar arrangements could be made with the Turks.⁷⁷

The problem, as Ball earlier observed, is that once such matters were broached with the Turks this American concession 'will be all over Western Europe, and our position would have been undermined'. As Macmillan noted in 'On the Brink', if there was a deal over Turkey, 'All America's allies would feel that to avoid the Cuban threat the U.S. Government had bargained away their protection'. He, however, was under the impression that 'Kennedy....never wavered on this issue'.⁷⁸ This, indeed, was very much the impression – for exactly the reasons given by Macmillan – which the President wished to convey. As Kennedy noted at the time, this was made more problematic because the Turkey/Cuba swap had been raised publicly by Khrushchev. His approach to ExComm that day was therefore about how to respond without appearing to cave in, not least to his NATO allies.⁷⁹ US ambassadors were therefore told to avoid any Cuba/Turkey linkage. Bruce was certainly under the impression that the Turkey option had been rejected.⁸⁰

To reinforce this message, ExComm agreed that Thomas Finletter, the US Permanent representative, should brief a NATO Council in Paris. His briefing notes were passed on to the British government at some time on 28 October. Significantly, they claimed that hopes of a solution were diminished by Khrushchev's letter of 27 October 'linking Cuban settlement to withdrawal of NATO Jupiters from Turkey, but we continue to press for solution in Cuban framework alone'. Instead, the continuing build-up of the missile sites was stressed. Allies were also warned that some ships were still heading to the quarantine zone. The NATO Council was thus informed that 'In these circumstances the US Government may find it necessary within a short time in its own interest and that of its fellow nations in the Western

hemisphere to take whatever military action may be necessary to remove this growing threat to the hemisphere'.⁸¹

The US message to its allies was therefore that military action, for which preparations throughout the crisis had been taking place, may be imminent and that missile trades were not on the table. As noted in Ormsby-Gore's telegram received at 3.38am (London time) on 28 October, their line on the Thor offer was therefore that 'this w[oul]d look as though the US w[oul]d be prepared to trade the security of European nations for US security in the Western hemisphere'.⁸² A similar line was also taken by the President's National Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy, in a call to de Zulueta at 1.30am (BST).⁸³ They had a further conversation at 4.00am (BST) in which Bundy conveyed the essence of the Finletter briefing to the British, played down progress at the UN and suggested that the Prime Minister's Thor proposal 'is not yet right and what we would much rather have is active participation....in the North Atlantic Council' set for 10.00am on 28 October [Paris time].⁸⁴ Bundy's subsequent notes on this conversation make it clear that, while the US did not want to appear to cave in before its European allies, those same allies were being encouraged to do the caving for them. Bundy recorded that he 'tried to hint....delicately that if the UK is interested in the Jupiter proposal, it should say so in the North Atlantic Council'.⁸⁵ However, the UK was not interested in the Jupiter proposal, which was seen as positively dangerous. Throughout the crisis the British had instead been concerned to keep it confined to the western hemisphere and avoid any linkage between Cuba and anywhere else, with the possible exception of the British Thors. This aim to keep the crisis in Cuba was very much behind Home's instructions to Dean on 27 October. Not only was de Zulueta therefore not interested in taking up the Jupiter option (having been led to believe that the US were not either), but – particularly at that time in the morning – he was not even attuned to taking up the subtle hints that he should be.⁸⁶

Bundy used alarmist language to try to push the British towards picking up his hints. It had the opposite effect to that intended. Not for the first time, Bundy misread Macmillan.⁸⁷ The Prime Minister, like his private secretary, missed the hints but was alarmed by the tone of the rest of the conversation. He was no more reassured by the President's reply to Khrushchev, responding to his offer on Cuba and ignoring Turkey, which was received in London at 1.30am.⁸⁸ Subsequently in 'On the Brink' Macmillan was to credit this with successfully solving the crisis without resort to conflict, passing over very briefly his manoeuvres of that fraught weekend.⁸⁹ Yet on that Sunday morning of 28 October he clearly remained anxious. A draft message to Kennedy spoke of Macmillan's concern that U Thant was not getting anywhere. The Prime Minister wanted to contact Khrushchev directly 'when it is apparent that he is not giving way and before you are forced by his stubbornness or by the local situation to take drastic action. Can you help me on timing?' The text as actually transmitted, seemingly at 9.52am GMT, was rather more anodyne, but still contained the timing question.⁹⁰

In 'On the Brink' Macmillan says that he then decided the timing issue himself in the absence of further communications from an early morning Washington.⁹¹ There is certainly no evidence of an American response. The message transmitted to Moscow at around noon (and delivered by Roberts at 2.35pm Moscow time), however, was rather different from the draft he had sent to Kennedy the previous day. By then Macmillan seems to have seen Dean's telegram which had arrived in London at 5.28am, reporting that Castro had accepted the U Thant visit proposal.⁹² Accordingly, Macmillan's message to Khrushchev briefly touched on dealing with the missiles in Cuba through the United Nations,⁹³ before moving on to responding positively to the Soviet leader's own olive branch on a nuclear test ban agreement

in his message to Kennedy on 27 October.⁹⁴ Evans described this as ‘a mouselike message’.⁹⁵ In the absence of American approval of any other message, it however picked up on the one aspect of Khrushchev’s communication that Macmillan, who had long been seeking such a test ban agreement, could legitimately address.

Bruce’s view was that it was ‘designed to impress [Khrushchev] with British solidarity on US Cuban policy’. Certainly there was nothing in it the US could object to. Macmillan’s main regret, he told Bruce, was that he had not sent it ‘several hours earlier’.⁹⁶ As it was little time had elapsed when, towards the end of Macmillan’s lunch, the message came through that Khrushchev had said to Kennedy ‘that the equipment on Cuba “which you call offensive” would be dismantled packed up and returned to the Soviet Union’.⁹⁷ After all the tension the reaction of Macmillan and Home was, Bruce noted, ‘mildly euphoric. Now, perhaps, a number of people immobilized during this emergency can devote future weekends to depleting the game-birds who are ravaging British agriculture’.⁹⁸

Macmillan noted in his diary that the British message, not given to the press until 4.15pm (GMT), appeared to be ‘backing the horse after the race’.⁹⁹ Nevertheless, this may not have been a bad thing: as Ormsby-Gore pointed out that evening to Rusk in Washington, rather than allowing the Soviets to seize the initiative, the West must get in first with their proposals for peace, picked up in Macmillan’s message.¹⁰⁰ Now was the time to seek the general negotiations the Prime Minister had toyed with at the start of the crisis. From Macmillan’s point of view it certainly gave a fillip to his efforts for a test ban agreement and a reduction in cold war tensions. It was therefore appropriate that he ended ‘On the Brink’ with a quote from a letter he received from the Russian leader on 27 November 1962: ‘I fully share your view, as well as that of President Kennedy, that the Cuban crisis has led to a better understanding of the need for a prompt settlement of acute international problems’.¹⁰¹

By the time Macmillan wrote this chapter both Khrushchev and Kennedy were dead. Khrushchev published some expurgated memoirs in 1971, the year of his death. However, the assassination of John Kennedy in 1963 ensured that the main Western principal in the crisis did not survive to publish memoirs. The only substantial rival account available at the time was therefore Robert Kennedy’s posthumously-published version, ghost-written for him by Theodore Sorenson,¹⁰² to which Macmillan obliquely refers briefly in his own book.¹⁰³ David Nunnerley’s journalistic account, *Prime Kennedy and Britain* (1972) appeared too late to be noticed in the preparation of ‘On the Brink’.¹⁰⁴

This chapter therefore largely relied upon contemporary materials. This prompted concern from the Cabinet Office, when it came to vetting *At the End of the Day*, about the plethora of verbatim quotes from classified letters, minutes and transcripts of telephone conversations. The Cabinet Secretary, Sir Burke Trend, asked if these extensive extracts could be paraphrased as ‘it would be particularly embarrassing for us if verbatim quotations from American sources (mainly President Kennedy’s messages) were published in this country’.¹⁰⁵ A total of 44 changes were suggested by the Cabinet Office,¹⁰⁶ 17 of these relating to ‘On the Brink’. One was merely a correction to Macmillan’s account of Cuban history. Four were deletions suggested to avoid giving offence to foreign governments who might have objected, for instance, to a diary quotation referring to the French as contemptuous, the Germans as very frightened, the Italians as windy and the Scandinavians as sour as well as windy. This was not only undiplomatic but, certainly as far as the French were concerned, incorrect.¹⁰⁷

The only deletion recommended that Macmillan jibed at – writing ‘why?’ in the margin – was any reference to the Thors. Presumably he was wondering why he was asked not to

mention a weapon which had been decommissioned ten years earlier. He nevertheless complied with these requests, with the exception of brief passing references to the Thor offer.¹⁰⁸ The other 11 changes recommended were to summarise the extracts. This, however, clearly had limited effect on their preponderance in the chapter. Macmillan may have complained that Churchill's *The Hinge of Fate* (the fourth volume of his memoir of *The Second World War*) contained 'too many memoranda and minutes printed verbatim. This hinders the flow of the narrative'.¹⁰⁹ Nevertheless, his account of the Cuban missile crisis suffered even more from this tendency. Whereas parts of Churchill's *The World Crisis* and *The Second World War* rely on such documents for more than 40 per cent of the text,¹¹⁰ the percentage of original documents in the text of 'On the Brink' was closer to 70-80 per cent. Cabinet Office strictures clearly had limited effect, with the publisher reluctant to comply so close to publication to requests for changes that 'would spoil the book and entail very expensive correction if we were to paraphrase them'.¹¹¹

This probably also reflected a sense of the centrality of the Cuba section to the marketing of the book. The second paragraph of the dust jacket text proclaimed 'The British side of the Cuba crisis is told here for the first time. The continuous contact that took place, sometimes several times a day, between Prime Minister and President reveals the closeness of their personal relationship and shows how strong was British influence and support.' This clearly developed the idea of repeated calls between the two leaders, rather than the total of four telephone conversations during the height of the crisis. A similar line was also stressed in the pre-publication publicity.

The object clearly was not just to puff the book but also to engage with media and Opposition allegations at the time of the Cuban crisis that British influence with the US had been negligible. The Labour frontbencher Richard Crossman, who had worked as Macmillan's propaganda officer at Allied Forces Headquarters in North Africa during the Second World War, wrote in *The Guardian* on 26 October 1962 that these events exploded the myth of British influence.¹¹² This theme of lack of consultation was taken up by his party leader, Hugh Gaitskell, in the Commons debate on the Queen's Speech on 30 October 1962.¹¹³ Amongst the Opposition there are hints from other leading figures such as Harold Wilson that this line was taken so as to justify their then argument that nuclear weapons did not buy Britain influence and therefore ought to be abandoned.¹¹⁴

Macmillan's attempts to counter this in the House on 30 October 1962 were unconvincing, not least because he was unable to go into detail on the substance of his talks with Kennedy.¹¹⁵ Macmillan told the Cabinet that Kennedy and his advisers 'had shown themselves ready to ask for and to consider advice. This had been done with commitment on either side', but disclose of these talks might embarrass less-privileged European allies.¹¹⁶ A key objective in 'On the Brink' was therefore, as Macmillan admitted, to dispel these accusations 'that there was no "special relationship" between London and Washington' by establishing the regularity and quality of their discussions.¹¹⁷ This was achieved, for instance, by including Kennedy's message of 22 October, suggesting that the two men 'discuss the situation between ourselves by means of our private channel of communication'.¹¹⁸ This channel was the KY-9 scrambler telephone, installed on 6 September 1961, supplemented by the KW-26 teleprinter. Macmillan commented in his diary on 4 November 1962 that these worked without a hitch, after a summer during which the link had been bedevilled by technical faults. This was not a universal view, *The Times* on 27 November 1962 reporting an American press briefing which belittled the Macmillan-Kennedy conversations and suggested the Prime Minister disliked this form of communication. The real problem, de Zulueta wrote

to Ormsby-Gore, was that the President kept on forgetting he had to take his finger off the button to allow Macmillan to speak.¹¹⁹

The scrambler phone also distorted voices. This may account for the seemingly unenlightening nature of the transcripts. But then, as anyone who has tried to recapture the fire of a Lloyd George from the reproduction in Hansard would know, transcripts convey only a part of orality. In a passage Macmillan drafted to add to the chapter but which was not in the end included he noted ‘We used flat and commonplace phrases of everyday life and humdrum affairs. Nevertheless, we both knew we were discussing the future, and perhaps the survival of the civilised world’.¹²⁰ In talk between two men who clearly trusted and liked each other there are always likely to be unspoken assumptions and understandings that a transcript may not capture, such as the somewhat hesitant way in which Macmillan introduced the Thor offer on 26 October. Nevertheless, Kennedy’s message of 22 October warmly observed: ‘It is a source of great personal satisfaction to me that you and I can keep in close touch with each other by rapid and secure means at a time like this, and I intend to keep you fully informed of my thinking as the situation evolves’.¹²¹

As it turned out, however, Macmillan was far from fully informed throughout the crisis. One example is that when writing ‘On the Brink’ Macmillan remained unaware of the deal the US had made with the Soviets over the Turkish missiles. Kennedy was also selective in the aspects of crisis management he sounded out the Prime Minister’s views on. British influence on the conduct of the crisis did not, despite the image deliberately cultivated by the extensive edited transcripts of transatlantic telephone calls presented in ‘On the Brink’, emerge through such direct means.

In the past it has often been thought that the main British contributions to the management of the Cuban crisis were confined to advice from Ormsby-Gore about the breadth of the quarantine, and the pressure that led to publication of the photographs of the missile sites. Macmillan clearly believed that his ambassador did make a significant contribution to the first of these.¹²² As noted above, however, Macmillan’s account of the second in ‘On the Brink’ is inaccurate. Moreover, it understates the British role in encouraging the Americans to publicize their photographic evidence of the missiles, not least in the UN.

This may reflect Macmillan’s tendency in his subsequent writings systematically to underplay the importance of the UN in his thinking at the time of the crisis. Dean is, indeed, only once mentioned in the whole of *At the End of the Day*, as having played a useful supporting role during the Cuban missile crisis to Stevenson, whom Macmillan cordially disliked.¹²³ ‘On the Brink’ similarly occluded – not least because of the Cabinet Office stipulation not to offend foreign governments – the very considerable efforts expended by the British on inter-Allied and inter-Commonwealth relations during the crisis to maintain solidarity with the Americans.

This tendency has also been replicated in later literature. Although Macmillan credited the use of the UN with the resolution of the crisis in the Cabinet of 29 October,¹²⁴ in the historiography this dimension has until recently been overshadowed by the Thor offer. However, in the same conversation that he raised the latter with Kennedy, on 26 October, he first signalled his support for the idea of Cuban inviolability and then reiterated the idea of a UN mission to ensure the missiles were inoperable. These measures would also help to head off the tendency of the increasingly assertive non-aligned countries at the UN to focus on the quarantine and not on the larger problem of the missiles.¹²⁵ As the quarantine started to bite, these became the crucial issues for Macmillan, hence his change of mind over the merits of military action. Indeed, getting a credible UN inspection regime in place was a key means of

avoiding such military action, with all the risks that implied. A credible inspection regime was also, incidentally, a way of making progress on the test ban issue. The Thor offer was thus a backup, ‘a third point’ as Macmillan put it in the conversation of 26 October: its minor role in ‘On the Brink’ is accordingly appropriate.¹²⁶

That morning Kennedy had reminded ExComm that there were three ways to remove the Soviet missiles; by negotiation, trade or invasion.¹²⁷ As the crisis developed Macmillan moved rapidly from the third option to concentrating on the first, through the auspices of the UN, with the second playing a minor role in the form of the Thor proposal. Indeed, the necessity of the first option was pointed up by the risk otherwise of a US invasion, the unpredictable consequences of which Macmillan by the end of the crisis clearly feared. UN involvement was seen as a key means of providing the reassurance necessary, given the lack of trust between the parties, to make progress on the objectives of inviolability and inspection. These two objectives reflected the ideas floated in Macmillan’s conversation with the President on 26 October and formed the core of his message to Kennedy on the following evening. It is not clear what time this arrived in Washington. It certainly was not directly discussed in ExComm that afternoon. However, some hours later, Kennedy’s reply to Khrushchev released about 8.00pm (Washington time) on 27 October was much closer in tone to Macmillan than it was to the drafts being prepared by various members of ExComm, not least in highlighting these same themes of inviolability and inspection under the aegis of the UN.¹²⁸ This was the message that Macmillan in ‘On the Brink’ saw as solving the crisis.¹²⁹

We now know that Khrushchev had decided to withdraw the missiles two days earlier. However, his problem then was how to manage this process?¹³⁰ The Turkey swap idea he raised was a means to cover this withdrawal, but one which ironically heightened tension with the Americans. Interestingly, Macmillan’s speculations about Khrushchev’s conduct of the crisis, written in his diary on 4 November 1962 and largely reproduced in ‘On the Brink’, make it clear he was aware that two sites were not comparable. ‘The Turkey base is useful, but not vital. Cuba was vital’. The latter, however, was threatened by the American build-up to an invasion planned for 29 October which, as Macmillan recognised, could not be stopped by conventional military means. By withdrawal Khrushchev avoided the risk of having to use nuclear weapons, but also preserved Castro, Soviet prestige and his missiles, which were shipped home.¹³¹ Indeed, to some extent Khrushchev was also given the credit as the peacemaker, in contrast to the bellicose Americans, in the non-aligned world.¹³² Macmillan’s immediate judgement of Khrushchev’s decision-making was thus not without merit. What he did not know, either at the time or subsequently, was that Khrushchev also succeeded in secretly getting the American missiles out of Turkey and Italy as well.

In his comments in ExComm on 26 October Kennedy implied that the three options were alternative strategies. In practice, he pursued all simultaneously. Macmillan was never aware of this. He did not know that Bobby Kennedy had indicated to Anatoly Dobrynin, the Russian ambassador to Washington, that the Jupiters could quietly be withdrawn from Turkey within four to five months should a satisfactory arrangement on Cuba be reached. In part this was because the British seemingly did not imagine such a possibility, as being outside the Western hemisphere. But it was also because the Americans deliberately misled them, their other Allies and indeed their own ambassadors on this point. Roberts noted in his despatch on 29 October that his American counterpart fully shared his surprise at the rapid and complete Soviet climb-down.¹³³ Deliberate American dissimulation both distracted from the Turkey offer and ramped up as far as their allies were concerned the risk of warfare.¹³⁴ The worse example of lack of consultation from the Americans was thus not one Macmillan could try to

downplay in ‘On the Brink’. This was because he was not himself ever aware of it. Ironically, however, neither were those who had in 1962 complained about the lack of consultation by the Americans.

When this story did eventually come out,¹³⁵ it reinforced notions of the lack of British influence. Macmillan’s government were portrayed as pursuing a Thor trade that would never shape Washington’s thinking, because the Americans were already moving to the Turkey swop instead. The Thor offer was thus easily dismissed merely as reflecting, as Macmillan’s own diary reference on 4 November put it, ‘the frightful desire to do something’. This is despite the fact that the same sentence went on to acknowledge that ‘not to do anything (except to talk to the President and keep Europe and the Commonwealth calm and firm) was prob[ably] the right answer’.¹³⁶ Indeed, the British did not do anything that they considered out of keeping with the American line. The Thor offer went unpursued. More important were their efforts to promote the UN-validated way forward which became the basis on which a solution emerged.

Before publication *The Spectator* referred to *At the End of the Day* as the most eagerly awaited volume of the memoirs.¹³⁷ This, though, was because it expected revelations not about October 1962 but about the end of Macmillan’s premiership in October 1963. Cuba was not always as central to the reception of the book as the pre-publicity had assumed. Nor did it sell as well as *The Spectator* might have envisaged. At a time when respectable fiction sales were around 5,000 copies the figure reported of 20,326 non-US sales by the end of 1979 was certainly good. However, it was still way behind the sales figures for the first two volumes of the autobiography.¹³⁸ Furthermore, ‘On the Brink’ does not seem to have helped sales in the US. Just over two years after publication Harper & Row wrote that sales had been very slow and ‘we must let the book go out of print’.¹³⁹

In the US there was no tie-in television programme, as there was in Britain. Such a tie-in had been envisaged when the memoirs first started to appear. On 5-7 January 1966, for transmission to mark the first volume of memoirs, Macmillan was interviewed at Birch Grove over three days by John Grist, Nigel Lawson (who had been attached to Number 10 at the end of Macmillan’s premiership and by then moved on to edit *The Spectator*) and Charles Collingwood (of the US broadcaster, CBS).¹⁴⁰ About two weeks later, CBS decided that they did not want to be tied to a trade publication.¹⁴¹ The BBC nevertheless paid \$5,000 for the American rights to a programme that was not broadcast there, as well as £1,000 for the British programme.¹⁴² This was, as Grist noted, ‘a quite exceptional fee’.¹⁴³ It, however, remained in place as the series was, like the memoirs, extended from the three programmes initially envisaged. The only substantial change was that from the second programme onwards the Canadian psephologist R. T. McKenzie, a professor from the London School of Economics, conducted each interview with Macmillan.

Accordingly, by the time *At the End of the Day* appeared, these BBC interviews followed a familiar and well-tested format, with broadcast on the actual day of publication. On this occasion filming took place at Birch Grove on 6-8 August 1973. After filming the producer, Margaret Douglas, would usually then edit down about five hours of rushes into a single broadcast of fifty minutes. With *At the End of the Day* however, the BBC concluded that the material was so rich that they needed two programmes.¹⁴⁴ The first dealt with Europe, economic problems, the ‘Night of the Long Knives’ cabinet reshuffle of July 1962 and culminated with Cuba. Suitably puffed in the BBC’s listing journal, the *Radio Times*,¹⁴⁵ it was broadcast on 19 September 1973. The second, covering security and scandals, transmitted a week later on the day of publication.

McKenzie had first interviewed Macmillan in 1954 and later wrote of his ‘genuine and deep affection for the greatest living Englishman’,¹⁴⁶ an accolade which Macmillan – who modelled himself on Churchill in so many ways – no doubt deeply relished. Unlike Churchill, Macmillan was a consummate performer on television. McKenzie’s unobtrusive style provided a perfect foil. Together they developed an easy rapport which, through the medium of these programmes, as the Audience Research Report [ARR] testified, brought out Macmillan’s ‘qualities as a conversationalist, a person and as a politician’. As such, they also helped to develop Macmillan’s final career: he came across, the ARR reported, as an elder statesman in an age of pygmies.

This was despite a limited audience share – being broadcast after the 9.00pm watershed – estimated at not much more than 5 per cent of the British public.¹⁴⁷ Newspaper reports of the programme, however, greatly extended its reach. In particular, all picked up the assertion made in the interview (but not in ‘On the Brink’) that Macmillan was rung three times a day by the President. This was a considerable exaggeration, as was Macmillan’s claim that he suggested publication of the photographic evidence of the missile sites. So was the statement that NATO only had two to three divisions in Western Europe at the time, facing some 100 Soviet divisions.¹⁴⁸ It, however, reinforced Macmillan’s preceding point about the risk that Berlin would be seized if the Americans had attacked Cuba. It was in such circumstances that Macmillan thought the Turkey swop idea so dangerous for ‘all credibility’ – including in Berlin – ‘in the American protection of Europe would have gone’. The Americans clearly agreed, hence in 1973 they continued to cover-up the fact that this swop had nonetheless happened.

Macmillan’s exaggerations in the broadcast built up two key impressions. The first was of the risks, not least in Europe, during the crisis. The second was of Macmillan calmly and regularly responding to the President’s requests for advice. This was reinforced by McKenzie’s voiceover which introduced this section of the interview in which he pointed out that the ‘intimate personal link with Kennedy is one of the striking themes of Mr Macmillan’s book’.¹⁴⁹ The journalists who reported on the programme clearly agreed, with the *Daily Mail* going so far as to headline its piece ‘How I helped to stop World War Three’.¹⁵⁰

In his more measured review of *At the End of the Day* Richard Crossman drew attention to the Churchillian approach adopted throughout Macmillan’s memoirs. Hitherto, however, he felt that Macmillan had done so with little success: whereas Churchill ‘stamped his personality on everything he wrote’, Macmillan did not. ‘In private conversation and, to a remarkable extent, on the television screen he has always been a very different person – debonair, adventurous, and deliciously cynical....Unfortunately, this private personality, which comes bouncing so gaily out of the little black box, is almost entirely excluded from his writing.’ For Crossman, however, *At the End of the Day* was one of the better volumes of the memoirs, and also successful in challenging Crossman’s contemporary impressions. He noted:

At the time, many of us thought that Britain hadn’t been consulted. We couldn’t have been more wrong. The British Prime Minister was the only non-American completely in Kennedy’s confidence. So Kennedy at night....called up his old friend to try out his ideas....Macmillan has had to wait a long time before he could take the credit he deserves.¹⁵¹

It has been observed that Churchill’s larding of his text with contemporary documents sometimes gave it a spurious authenticity.¹⁵² In this instance, even for a sceptical reviewer

like Crossman, Macmillan seems to have succeeded in doing the same. Gregg Harken suggests that a common theme of the Cold War memoir is the settling of scores,¹⁵³ and in this case Macmillan sought to achieve this by drawing attention to his extensive contacts with the President in a way he was unable to do at the time. ‘On the Brink’ does not seek to offer the blow-by-blow account of how Macmillan experienced the crisis attempted in this chapter. Significant phases and themes are excluded from the narrative. Instead, the impression was conveyed – and even more so in Macmillan’s skilful television performance – that Kennedy ‘wanted to consult me all the time’. This was, however, more of a response to his contemporary British critics, like Crossman, than an accurate evocation of Macmillan’s experience of ‘that strange period’;¹⁵⁴ in the process diverting attention from some of the key themes in the British approach to the crisis, such as the role the UN could play in managing a settlement. That in ‘On the Brink’ and *a fortiori* in his television interview with McKenzie, Macmillan was successful in responding to his contemporary critics is suggested by the comment in *The Guardian*’s review of the programme:

The myth that Britain was left unconsulted by John Kennedy while he played poker with the fate of the world against Khrushchev over the 1962 Cuban missile crisis is finally dispelled by Harold Macmillan today.

It is entirely appropriate that this article was entitled ‘Mac and Jack’ since the effect of Macmillan’s successive accounts of the Cuban missile crisis was indeed to establish, with some success, a misleading view of the British side of the Cuban missile crisis as essentially the Mac and Jack show.¹⁵⁵

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¹ I am grateful to Kevin O’Daly, Len Scott, Willie Thompson and Mark J. White for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

² See Peter Catterall (ed), *The Macmillan Diaries: Prime Minister and After 1957-1966* (London: Macmillan, 2011), pp.508-18.

³ ‘Harold Macmillan talks to Robert McKenzie about the last years of his premiership – Part One’ *The Listener* 11 October 1973, pp.482-6. See also ‘Harold Macmillan talks to Robert McKenzie about the last years of his premiership – Part Two’ *The Listener*, 18 October 1973, pp.507-10.

⁴ BBC Written Archives Centre, Caversham [henceforward WAC]: R94/72/1, John Grist to Bush Bailey, 19 January 1966.

⁵ Alan Maclean, *No, I tell a lie, it was the Tuesday...* (London: Kyle Cathie, 1997), chap.13.

⁶ Peter Catterall, ‘At the End of the Day: Macmillan’s Account of the Cuban Missile Crisis’ *International Relations*, 26/3 (2012), p.269.

⁷ Catterall, *Prime Minister and After*, p. 645 (10 December 1964).

⁸ Macmillan & Co archives, British Library, London [henceforward M&Co]: Uncatalogued folder ‘At the End of the Day 2’ undated finance note. I am grateful to Alysoun Saunders and Helen Melody for access to these papers.

⁹ M&Co: Uncatalogued folder ‘Harold Macmillan general’, Macmillan to Lord Carrington, 6 August 1980.

¹⁰ The National Archives, London [henceforward TNA]: CAB 129/107, C(61)172, Harold Macmillan, ‘Memoirs: Disclosure of Official Information’, 30 October 1961.

¹¹ Interview with Anne Glyn-Jones, 30 June 2014, supplemented by emails from Glyn-Jones to the author, 20 & 21 July 2014.

¹² Harold Macmillan, *At the End of the Day*, (London: Macmillan, 1973), pp.198, 201-2, 204-11, 215.

¹³ Macmillan, *At the End of the Day*, p.180; see also David Nunnerley, *President Kennedy and Britain* (London: The Bodley Head, 1972), p.77.

¹⁴ Catterall, *Prime Minister and After*, p.309 (17 June 1960); Macmillan, *At the End of the Day* p.181.

¹⁵ TNA: PREM 11/3689, Macmillan to Home tel. 4223, T480/62, 1 October 1962.

¹⁶ TNA: FO 371/162347, Joseph Godber memorandum, 27 September 1962.

¹⁷ James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn and David A. Welch, *Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis and the Soviet Collapse* (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), p.490.

¹⁸ Catterall, *Prime Minister and After*, p.502 (3 October 1962), original emphasis.

¹⁹ See Max Holland, ‘A Luce Connection: Senator Keating, William Pawley and the Cuban Missile Crisis’ *Journal of Cold War Studies* 1/3 (1999), pp.139-67.

²⁰ Macmillan, *At the End of the Day*, p.183.

²¹ Nigel Ashton, *Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War: The Irony of Interdependence* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), p.73; Raj Roy and John W. Young (eds) *Ambassador to Sixties London: The Diaries of David Bruce 1961-1969* (Dordrecht: Republic of Letters Publishing, 2009), p.78. TNA: PREM 11/3689, Ormsby-Gore tel 2623, 20 October 1962 however makes it clear that the ambassador was aware something was afoot.

²² Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow (eds) *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban missile crisis* (London: Belknap Press, 1997), pp.66, 92-3.

²³ L. V. Scott, *Macmillan, Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis: Political, Military and Intelligence Aspects* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), p.37.

²⁴ Macmillan, *At the End of the Day*, p.194.

²⁵ TNA: PREM 11/3689, record of conversation, 23 October 1962.

²⁶ TNA: PREM 11/3689, record of conversation, 23 October 1962.

²⁷ Macmillan, *At the End of the Day*, p.190.

²⁸ Catterall, *Prime Minister and After*, pp.510-11 (23 October 1962); Macmillan, *At the End of the Day*, p.190.

²⁹ Robin Woolven, ‘What really happened in RAF Bomber Command during the Cuban missile crisis?’ in David Gioe, Len Scott and Christopher Andrew (eds), *An International History of the Cuban Missile Crisis: A 50-year retrospective* (London: Routledge, 2014), pp.176-95.

³⁰ Peter Catterall (ed), *The Macmillan Diaries: The Cabinet Years 1950-1957* (London: Macmillan, 2003), p.459 (25 July 1955).

³¹ TNA: PREM 11/3689, Macmillan to Kennedy, 22 October 1962 (despatched 9.35pm BST), tel. 7396, T492/62. This had, after all, been Macmillan’s own initial reaction to the news (see Len Scott, ‘Eyeball to Eyeball: America, Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis’ (this volume)).

³² TNA: PREM 11/3689, record of conversation, 23 October 1962.

³³ TNA: PREM 11/3689, ‘Points for President Kennedy’.

³⁴ See Richard Aldous, *Macmillan, Eisenhower and the Cold War* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2005).

³⁵ TNA: CAB 128/36, CC(62)61, Cabinet Conclusions, 23 October 1962, 10.30am, p.3.

³⁶ TNA: PREM 11/3689, Macmillan to Ormsby-Gore, 22 October 1962, tel. 7395, T.493/62; Macmillan, *At the End of the Day*, pp.187-9.

³⁷ Scott, *Macmillan, Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, pp168-9.

³⁸ TNA: PREM11/3690, Home tel 7457, 24 October 1962, Ormsby-Gore tel. 2667, 24 October 1962; Scott, *Macmillan, Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, p.95.

³⁹ Peter Catterall, ‘Modifying “a very dangerous message”: Britain, the non-aligned and the UN during the Cuban missile crisis’ in David Gioe, Len Scott and Christopher Andrew (eds), *An International History of the Cuban Missile Crisis: A 50-year retrospective* (London: Routledge, 2014), pp.82-3; TNA: PREM 11/3690, Nkrumah to Macmillan, 25 October 1962.

⁴⁰ Macmillan, *At the End of the Day*, p.201.

⁴¹ Catterall, *Prime Minister and After*, pp.511-12 (24 October 1962).

⁴² Catterall, ‘Modifying “a very dangerous message”’, pp.81-3; Macmillan, *At the End of the Day*, p.196.

⁴³ TNA: PREM11/3689, record of a meeting at Admiralty House, 23 October 1962, 5.00pm.

⁴⁴ May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes*, p.389; Department of Western Manuscripts, Bodleian Library, Oxford: Harold Macmillan Diaries: 23 October 1962.

⁴⁵ TNA: PREM11/3689, Bligh to Macmillan, 23 October 1962.

⁴⁶ Catterall, *Prime Minister and After*, p.512 (25 October 1962).

⁴⁷ According to the cover note: TNA: PREM11/3690, de Zulueta to Ormsby-Gore, 25 October 1962. Macmillan, *At the End of the Day*, p.198 puts the conversation at 11pm.

⁴⁸ Macmillan did not receive the U Thant message from Sir Patrick Dean at the British delegation to the UN in New York until the following morning: TNA: PREM11/3689, Dean, tel 1741, 25 October 1962 (received 6.55am).

⁴⁹ Macmillan, *At the End of the Day*, pp.198-204.

⁵⁰ TNA: PREM11/3690, Macmillan to Kennedy, T505/62, 25 October 1962.

⁵¹ May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes*, pp.427-30; Macmillan, *At the End of the Day*, pp.205-8; TNA: PREM 11/3690, record of conversation, 25 October 1962.

⁵² Scott, *Macmillan, Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, p.153.

⁵³ TNA: PREM 11/3690, Ormsby-Gore tel. 2690, 26 October 1962. See also Aleksander Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *Khrushchev’s Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006), p.441.

⁵⁴ TNA: PREM11/3691, Roberts tel. 2077, 28 October 1962 (received 1.59am).

⁵⁵ Macmillan, *At the End of the Day* (pp.209-12) follows his contemporary diary in referring to two conversations on 26 October, but there was only one that evening. It is possible Macmillan conflated that with the previous one which had run into the early hours of that morning.

⁵⁶ James G. Hershberg, ‘The United States, Brazil and the Cuban Missile Crisis (Part 2)’, *Journal of Cold War Studies* 6/3 (2004), pp.26-30.

⁵⁷ U Thant had raised this point on the day before as a means of reassuring the Cubans they did not need the Russian arms: TNA: PREM11/3690, Marchant tel. 464, 25 October 1962.

⁵⁸ May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes*, pp.481-2; Macmillan, *At the End of the Day*, pp.209-12; TNA: PREM 11/3690, record of conversation, 26 October 1962.

⁵⁹ Stephen Twigge and Len Scott, ‘The Other Other Missiles of October: The Thor IRBMs and the Cuban Missile Crisis’, *Electronic Journal of International History* 3, (2000), pp.3-4.

⁶⁰ TNA: PREM11/3690, Macmillan to Kennedy, T513/62, 27 October 1962.

⁶¹ As had Ambassador Bruce: Roy and Young, *Ambassador to Sixties London*, p.81 (27 October 1962).

⁶² Harold Evans, *Downing Street Diary: The Macmillan Years 1957/63*, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1981), p.225 (28 October 1962).

⁶³ TNA: PREM11/3690, Ormsby-Gore tel. 2697, 26 October 1962.

⁶⁴ May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes*, p.692.

⁶⁵ May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes*, pp.520-1.

⁶⁶ McKenzie, ‘Part One’, p.483.

⁶⁷ TNA: PREM 11/3691, Merchant tel. 477, 27 October 1962.

⁶⁸ TNA: PREM11/3691, full text of Mr Khrushchev’s message to President Kennedy, 27 October 1962.

⁶⁹ TNA: PREM11/3691, Home tel. 4200, 27 October 1962.

⁷⁰ TNA: PREM11/3691, FO tel. 7580 to Washington, 27 October 1962.

⁷¹ TNA: PREM11/3691, Kennedy to Macmillan, 27 October 1962, CAP5507/62.

⁷² Evans, *Downing Street Diary*, p.225.

⁷³ TNA: PREM11/3691, Macmillan to Kennedy, 27 October 1962, T518/62.

⁷⁴ TNA: PREM11/3691, Dean, tel. 1800, 27 October 1962.

⁷⁵ TNA: PREM11/3691, Ormsby-Gore, tel. 2701, 27 October 1962.

⁷⁶ TNA: PREM11/3691, Dean tel. 1801, 27 October 1962 (received 2.14am on 28 October 1962).

⁷⁷ May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes*, pp.568, 583. A Polaris submarine was indeed subsequently deployed off Turkey: Nasuh Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003* (New York: Nova, 2003), p.159.

⁷⁸ Macmillan, *At the End of the Day*, pp.212-13.

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- ⁷⁹ May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes*, pp.500-1, 528, 564.
- ⁸⁰ Blight, Allyn, Welch, *Cuba on the Brink*, p.498; Roy and Young, *Ambassador to Sixties London*, p.81 (27 October 1962).
- ⁸¹ TNA: PREM11/3691, briefing note for Finletter enclosed with Bligh to Samuel, 28 October 1962.
- ⁸² TNA: PREM11/3691, Ormsby-Gore tel. 2707, 27 October 1962.
- ⁸³ TNA: PREM11/3691, record of conversation, 28 October 1962 (1.30am).
- ⁸⁴ TNA: PREM11/3691, record of conversation, 28 October 1962 (4.00am).
- ⁸⁵ John F. Kennedy Library, Boston [henceforward JFKL]: NSF, Box 170A, Memorandum for the record by McGeorge Bundy, 27 October 1962.
- ⁸⁶ Ashton, *Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War*, p.83.
- ⁸⁷ Peter Catterall, ‘Identity and Integration: Macmillan, “Britishness” and the Turn towards Europe’, in Gilbert Millat (ed) *Angleterre ou Albion entre fascination et repulsion* (Lille: Presses de l'université Charles de Gaulle – Lille 3, 2006), p.162.
- ⁸⁸ TNA: PREM11/3691, teleprinter message, 28 October 1962 (1.30am).
- ⁸⁹ Macmillan, *At the End of the Day*, p.214.
- ⁹⁰ TNA: PREM11/3691, Macmillan to Kennedy, T520/62, 28 October 1962. Daylight saving changed in both countries, with the clocks going back one hour, at 2.00am on 28 October 1962.
- ⁹¹ Macmillan, *At the End of the Day*, p.214.
- ⁹² TNA: PREM11/3691, Dean tel. 1803, 28 October 1962.
- ⁹³ TNA: PREM11/3691, message to all Commonwealth Prime Ministers, T522/62, 28 October 1962.
- ⁹⁴ May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes*, p.507.
- ⁹⁵ Evans, *Downing Street Diary*, p.226.
- ⁹⁶ JFKL: NSF173, Bruce to Rusk, 28 October 1962 (8.00pm, GMT).
- ⁹⁷ TNA: PREM11/3691, teleprinter message, 28 October 1962 (1.15pm, GMT).
- ⁹⁸ JFKL: NSF173, Bruce to Rusk, 28 October 1962 (8.00pm, GMT). Bruce, like Macmillan and Home, was a keen shot.
- ⁹⁹ Macmillan, *At the End of the Day*, p.216.
- ¹⁰⁰ TNA: PREM11/3691, Ormsby-Gore tel. 2709, 28 October 1962 (received 7.03pm).
- ¹⁰¹ Macmillan, *At the End of the Day*, p.220.
- ¹⁰² Robert Kennedy, *Thirteen Days: a memoir of the Cuban missile crisis* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1971).
- ¹⁰³ Macmillan, *At the End of the Day*, p.214.
- ¹⁰⁴ Email from Anne Glyn-Jones, 21 July 2014.
- ¹⁰⁵ M&Co: Uncatalogued folder, ‘At the End of the Day 2’, Trend to Macmillan, 2 March 1973.
- ¹⁰⁶ In contrast, Buckingham Palace only asked for three changes to the text, none relating to ‘On the Brink’: M&Co: Uncatalogued folder, ‘At the End of the Day 2’, Martin Charteris to Macmillan, 20 March 1973.
- ¹⁰⁷ Catterall, *Prime Minister and After*, pp.514-15 (4 November 1962); Scott, *Macmillan, Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, p.181; Nunnerley, *President Kennedy and Britain*, p.80.
- ¹⁰⁸ Macmillan, *At the End of the Day*, pp.210, 212.
- ¹⁰⁹ Cited in Catterall, *The Cabinet Years*, p.xvii.
- ¹¹⁰ See Robin Prior, *Churchill's World Crisis as History* (Beckenham: Croom Helm, 1983), pp.277-9.
- ¹¹¹ M&Co: Uncatalogued folder, ‘At the End of the Day 2’, unnamed to Macmillan, 7 March 1973.
- ¹¹² Nunnerley, *President Kennedy and Britain*, p.75.
- ¹¹³ *House of Commons Debates*, 5th ser., vol. 666, col. 19 (30 October 1962).
- ¹¹⁴ *House of Commons Debates*, 5th ser., vol. 666, col. 161. (31 October 1962).
- ¹¹⁵ *House of Commons Debates*, 5th ser., Vol. 666, cols. 35-44 (30 October 1962) .
- ¹¹⁶ TNA: CAB 128/36, CC(62)63, Cabinet Conclusions, 29 October 1962, 10.30am, p.2.
- ¹¹⁷ Macmillan, *At the End of the Day*, p.198.
- ¹¹⁸ Cited in Macmillan, *At the End of the Day*, p.186.
- ¹¹⁹ Ashton, *Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War*, pp.86-7; Macmillan, *At the End of the Day*, p.220.
- ¹²⁰ M&Co: Uncatalogued folder, ‘At the End of the Day 2’, suggested amendment to p.220.
- ¹²¹ Cited in Macmillan, *At the End of the Day*, p.186.
- ¹²² Macmillan, *At the End of the Day*, p.197.
- ¹²³ Macmillan, *At the End of the Day*, p.219. Macmillan excluded the rude remark about Stevenson reproduced in Catterall, *Prime Minister and After*, p.517 (4 November 1962).
- ¹²⁴ TNA: CAB 128/36, CC(62)63, Cabinet Conclusions, 29 October 1962, 10.30am, p.2.
- ¹²⁵ Catterall, ‘Modifying “a very dangerous message”’, p.87.
- ¹²⁶ Macmillan, *At the End of the Day*, p.210.
- ¹²⁷ May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes*, pp.463-5.
- ¹²⁸ May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes*, pp.603-4.

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- ¹²⁹ Macmillan, *At the End of the Day*, p.214.
- ¹³⁰ Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, ‘One Hell of a Gamble’: *Khrushchev, Castro, Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis 1958-1964* (London: John Murray, 1997), pp.256-60, 283-87; Fursenko and Naftali, *Khrushchev’s Cold War*, pp.483-5.
- ¹³¹ Macmillan, *At the End of the Day*, pp.217-18.
- ¹³² Catterall, ‘Modifying “a very dangerous message”’, p.92.
- ¹³³ TNA: PREM11/3691, Roberts tel. 2081, 29 October 1962.
- ¹³⁴ McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years* (New York: Vintage, 1988), p.434.
- ¹³⁵ On the emergence of this story see Benoit Pelopidas’s chapter in this book.
- ¹³⁶ Macmillan, *At the End of the Day*, p.216.
- ¹³⁷ *The Spectator*, 7 July 1973.
- ¹³⁸ M&Co: Uncatalogued folder, ‘Harold Macmillan general’, David Ballheimer to Maclean, 22 November 1979; note to Macmillan, 26 February 1980. By this point *Winds of Change* had sold 40,453 copies, *Blast of War* 33,052, *Tides of Fortune* 18,676, *Riding the Storm* 16,310 and *Pointing the Way* 11,981.
- ¹³⁹ M&Co: Uncatalogued folder, ‘Past Masters 1’, Doris Karfinkel to Garnett, 27 April 1976.
- ¹⁴⁰ WAC: R94/72/1, Bush Bailey to Graham Watson, 30 December 1965, Bailey to Assistant Head of Programme Contracts, 29 December 1965; Catterall, *Prime Minister and After*, p.675 (9 January 1966).
- ¹⁴¹ WAC: R94/72/1, G. del Strother to Bailey, 19 January 1966.
- ¹⁴² WAC: R94/72/1, F. L. Hetley to Macmillan, 3 March 1966.
- ¹⁴³ WAC: R94/72/1, Grist to Bailey, 1 February 1966.
- ¹⁴⁴ M&Co: Uncatalogued folder ‘At the End of the Day 2’, Richard Garnett to Macmillan, 31 July 1973.
- ¹⁴⁵ *Radio Times*, 13 September 1973.
- ¹⁴⁶ ‘McKenzie on Macmillan’, *Radio Times*, 6 February 1979.
- ¹⁴⁷ Unfortunately no copy of the Audience Research Report for the Cuban broadcast has survived in the BBC Written Archives. These references come from the report for the sister programme broadcast a week later (WAC: T67/166/1, Audience Research Report, 15 October 1973).
- ¹⁴⁸ The *Daily Telegraph* report on 19 September 1973 further exaggerated this to 250 Soviet divisions.
- ¹⁴⁹ WAC: T67/166/1, Transcript of broadcast, 19 September 1973, pp.15-19.
- ¹⁵⁰ *Daily Mail*, 19 September 1973.
- ¹⁵¹ Richard Crossman, ‘Macmillan Bows Out’ *The Listener*, 27 September 1973, pp.422-3.
- ¹⁵² Prior, *Churchill’s World Crisis as History*, p.279; John Ramsden, *Man of the Century: Winston Churchill and his legend since 1945* (London: HarperCollins, 2002), chap.4.
- ¹⁵³ Gregg Harken, review of Thomas C. Reed, *At the Abyss: An Insider’s History of the Cold War* (New York: Ballantine, 2004), in *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 9/2 (2007), p.148.
- ¹⁵⁴ McKenzie, ‘Part One’, p.483.
- ¹⁵⁵ Philip Jordan, ‘Mac and Jack’ *The Guardian*, 19 September 1973.