Interrupting the Courtroom Organism: Screaming Bodies, Material Affects and the *Theatre of Cruelty*  
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Interrupting the Courtroom Organism: Screaming Bodies, Material Affects and the Theatre of Cruelty

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Abstract
This article offers a method of reading the courtroom which produces an alternative mapping of the space. My method combines a reading of Antonin Artaud’s Theatre of Cruelty with a Deleuzian theoretical analysis. I suggest that this is a useful method since it allows examination of the spatial praxes of the courtroom which pulsate with a power to organize, terrorize and to judge. This method is also able to conceptualize the presence of “screaming” bodies and living matter which are appropriated to build, as well as feed the presence and functioning of the courtroom space, or organism. By using a method that articulates the cry of these bodies in the shadow of the organism, it becomes clear that this cry is both unwelcome and suppressed by the courtroom. The howl of anxious bodies enduring the process and space of the law can be materialized through interruptions to the courtroom, such as when bodies stand when they should not and when they speak when they should be silent. These vociferous actualizations of the scream serve only to feed the organism they seek to disturb, yet if the scream is listened to before it disrupts, the interruption becomes-imperceptible to the courtroom. Through my Artaudian/Deleuzian reading, I give a voice to the corporeal gasp that lingers before the cry, which is embedded within the embodied multiplicity from which it is possible to draw a creative line of flight. The creative momentum of this line of flight produces a sustainable interruption to the courtroom process, which instead of being consumed by the system, has the potential to produce new courtroom alignments. My text therefore offers an alternative reading of the courtroom, and in doing so also offers a refined understanding of how to productively “interrupt” the courtroom process.

Keywords
courtroom, Deleuze, Artaud, affect, material, body, interruption

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I. Double Act

In *The Theatre and its Double*, Antonin Artaud does not attack the concept of theatre as a medium of performance; his project was not to eradicate theatre as a medium of artistic expression. Rather, it was to *interrupt* its seemingly rigid and rational discourse, which opposes the vitality of the sensory experience of the audience with the discursive nature of theatre’s conventions. Artaud envisaged a connective experience that would see the senses enveloped by space, which would produce a performance similar to the intensity and strangeness of the dream; the sort of dream where concepts become tangible and textured, and where it becomes possible to grasp at sounds. In order to do this, he needed to create a moment of violence that would be powerful enough to prise apart the rigidity of prevailing theatrical devices and narratives which he saw as thoroughly immutable, yet also ensure that the creative momentum generated by this moment of violence was sustained. For Artaud, the problem with theatre is that it does not provide an enriching and sensory experience for the body. For theatre to do this, the creative line of flight must burst from the very body and the imagination it oppresses. As Artaud writes, “The problem is to turn theatre into a function in the proper sense of the word, something as exactly localized as the circulation of our blood through our veins, or the apparently chaotic evolution of dream images in the mind…”[1]

In conceptualizing this moment of productive violence, Artaud sought not only to question the expression of these theatrical conventions, but also to open a space for exploration of the potential for sensory experience emerging *within* these conventions. His project was to seek out these ruptures within the rigidity of the structure. He sought to expand and explore these spaces and prospect for the richest and most intoxicating sensory-material couplings. I read Artaud as a materialist because he engages deeply with the spatial and linguistic arrangement of theatre and the capacity of its materiality to shape the sensory experience of the actors and the audience, as well as the medium of theatre itself.[2] Artaud sees theatre as holding the potential to be a space for the unfolding of mutual *sensory* experience. In order to do so, he does not do away entirely with theatrical conventions;[3] rather, he is anxious to experiment so as to maximize the potential for this sensory experience *within* the performance of theatrical discourse.

It is clear that Artaud identified that by reconnecting the theatre with the body we can transform theatre into an experience that is richly sensual. It is also clear that he did not consider theatre to be a space created for the body. For these reasons, I have chosen to use Artaud’s text *The Theatre and its Double* to explore how his project could be applied

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2. See Artaud, *The Theatre and its Double*, p. 7. He writes: “Our fossilized idea of theatre is tied in with our fossilized idea of a shadowless culture where, whatever way we turn, our minds meet with nothing but emptiness while space is full. But true theatre, because it moves and makes use of living instruments, goes on stirring up shadows, while life endlessly stumbles along.” See also Act 4 of this article.
to the courtroom. As I show below, the courtroom can be conceived as a theatrical space, as well as a highly oppressive space. The courtroom contains and twists bodies into its tiny caverns and grand paneled auditoria, with walls built to ensure the painful silencing of already terrorized bodies. Yet, like Artaud, I am not interested in saying that the courtroom should be abandoned altogether as a method of adjudication. Rather, I suggest that the courtroom could benefit from being interrupted in the same way that Artaud interrupted theatre.

In order to mobilize this reading of Artaud, I use the works of Deleuze and Guattari since they recognize that relations between and with our own bodies take place on a number of levels (most notably with, for instance, “surface organization” or solely with depth). Artaud is an explorer entirely of depth, returning experience absolutely to the body and detaching it from its experience of surface. My combined reading of Artaud and Deleuze is therefore able to accomplish recognition of the depths of the courtroom, while also recognizing that the disjunction between depth and surface is not absolute, with the eminently interruptible surface remaining. Artaud’s body is that which emanates impassioned howls, it occupies a realm below surface, where it skulks, shouts and transfigures itself into the sensible, “incorporeal frontier” of the organism. I will go on to examine the affect of the body on courtroom spatial praxes, and vice versa in the sections which follow. This will allow situation of the body in-relation-to the courtroom and its processory flows and spatial organization. This will be where the interruption begins to gather momentum, where it starts to form and threaten to burst from the messy corporeal depths.

I will map an image of the courtroom which draws on various literature which examines this space. I will then interrupt this traditional mapping through application of my Deleuzian/Artaudian theoretical method. It is hoped that the reader will gain a sense of the performative nature of the interruption, that the reader will sense it gathering momentum through each recognition of the presence and affect of bodies and material, together with the potential for these interruptions to produce new courtroom alignments which do not oppress and terrorize the body. Finally, I will consider the cumulative affect of this interruption, and how the nature of the interruption conceived here differs from a traditional understanding of an interruption as something which disrupts the process. This final section will suggest through the use of a case law example that the traditional “disruptive” interruption is not capable of delivering the desired jolt to the system; it only serves to nourish and feed that which it attempts to change. In summary, my aim here is to sketch an image of the courtroom, but also to configure the shifting basis from which a productively interrupting line of flight can be drawn.

II. The Double (Act 1: Having done with organs?)

In the traditional old courtrooms, such as the Old Bailey in London, there is strict segregation between the various courtroom participants; there is a line drawn between the

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5. *Id.*
judge, advocates, defendant and the public gallery and there is a line drawn between performers and audience. These barriers are solid partitions, or they are changes in spatial levels. The effect is almost mythical and church-like, where all who enter feel the “generosity, verticality, exclusivity, grandeur, dignity and awe” of the space and of the law. The older courtrooms create an imposing and also terrifying space where the interior is dark and wooden, with paneling and pews. In the newer courtrooms, such as a local crown or county court, the look is slightly softer, with less verticality and grandeur, but there still remains strong maintenance of boundaries between the actors (and audience) despite the interior having a lighter look. In addition to the obvious spaces of the courtroom, such as the judge’s bench, the bar, the dock, the jury box, the public gallery and the press box, there are other less-obvious, hidden but crucial spaces. These are spaces such as the judge’s private chambers, which sit behind the bench, as well as a network of corridors that exist outside of the courtroom itself, but are integral to accessing each area. These corridors and alleys are also an essential part of the courtroom process, with many legal negotiations and conversations taking place within them. The divisions that are maintained do not only take place at a surficial level; there is also a depth and excess to these spatial divisions. Mulcahy writes that spatial praxes within the courtroom are founded on a “discourse of difference based on gender and class” which is entrenched via “excessive boundary maintenance.” The boundaries that are maintained within the courtroom are a violent division between those who are educated and those who are not; those who are within the law and those who are outside of it. There is a deep quality to these spatial praxes: they stretch back through history.

These boundaries, levels and various courtroom actors constitute the structured organism of the court, since they are legal singularities, or organs as instruments of

8. See Mulcahy, L., *Legal Architecture* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), p. 14 onwards, for an account of the historical development of the courtroom and its function as both a space of legal process, as well as a ceremonially institution designed to inspire awe in those who are present within the room.
10. See Mulcahy, *Legal Architecture*, pp. 48–51, often these spaces are designed by architects to facilitate the continued segregation of the space – to maintain the exclusivity of the spatial zone and minimize the risk of cross-contamination of bodies. Also see Hanson, “The Architecture of Justice” and Act 3 of this article, where these hidden spaces can also become productive moments of rupture within the courtroom organism.
13. See Mulcahy, *Legal Architecture*, p. 38 onwards. Advocates are separated from their client, which seems illogical from a practical point of view, yet it becomes apparent that the boundary is not only spatial, but social and hierarchical. See also p. 59 onwards regarding the spatial practice of positioning the defendant within the dock and how this significantly contradicts the presumption of innocence.
the law and are each necessary for the functioning of the courtroom space and the
process. It is of course possible to draw an analogy with the instruments and singularities of the theatre: the stage, the stalls, the circle, the bar, the actors, the writers, the producers, the directors and the audience. These distinct spatial areas and bodies are inextricably tied to the function of law, or the function of theatre, where the zones and actors with their discrete roles constitute the organism of the courtroom, or the theatre. They appear to be crucial to the smooth functioning of the organism and the harsh segregation between zones perpetuates the myth that it is necessary to remain within them. Moving outside of these zones, or acting against the imposed function would be contrary to the spirit of the organism. As Deleuze and Guattari explain, “You will be organized, you will be organism, you will articulate your body – otherwise you’re just depraved. You will be signifier and signified, interpreter and interpreted – otherwise you’re just a deviant…”\textsuperscript{14} It is therefore deviant and depraved to question the fabric of the organism and to question, or interrupt it, is to put yourself outside of it. It is an act of making yourself incomprehensible before the organism and to refuse to be part of it; you must articulate your body in a manner which conforms to and nourishes the organism. In the case of the courtroom, your movement must be slow and vertical, you must not show any emotion and you must not make any sounds apart from submissions or the giving of evidence. The space and the correct articulation of bodies is essential to the process of the court hearing and to disrupt its functioning, is to disrupt the law. Hyde writes that marginalized and disfavored bodies are perceived by the law as threats to social order, a perception which originates in law’s inclination to accept generalized identities.\textsuperscript{15} This is explicitly played out in the courtroom through examples such as the case of the “Naked Rambler,” where the body is displayed in its full odorous glory in the course of the defendant’s articulation of his marginalized identity.\textsuperscript{16} But why would anyone want to disrupt the functioning of the courtroom and why try to interrupt it so violently, since it is clear that such cries tend to strengthen the will of the law to restore order? It seems there is a perceived rigidity to the courtroom space and process which can only be disrupted or changed through such extreme activism, yet this is not entirely so.

\textsuperscript{16} See the Scottish case of Steve Gough, or the “Naked Rambler.” He was charged with various public indecency offenses by virtue of taking various naked walks in Scotland. He refused to undertake the court process fully clothed and insisted on doing so in the nude. Gough was completely removed from the process and not allowed to be present at his own hearing until he appeared appropriately clothed (see MacQueen, H.L., Scots Law News \textit{Edinburgh Law Review}, (2004), 149). The courtroom is arguably the most “clothed” space there is, with various superfluous adornments such as wigs and robes being necessary in many cases, or suits at the very least. In not articulating his body in accordance with the process, Gough was incoherent before the process, and forced out of it entirely. This brings into question how ill-equipped the process is to deal with marginal bodies, or simply different bodily articulation.
While the courtroom (and the theatre) can be seen as an organism, that is, it is an organized structure built of spatial zones and particular entities; this is not the extent of its body. Rather, the body is constituted of strata, of always immanent layers. This means that while an aspect of the courtroom can be characterized as an organism comprising forcibly obedient bodies, it also holds within it the power to overcome its own organization. The means by which it can do this is by ascending its “Body without Organs” (BwO). The BwO can be seen as immanent potential to overcome organization, but it is not separate to organization, rather, it is the potential to disrupt itself from within itself. The BwO is a vast pool of potential movements and affects, which means it necessarily departs from organization. It is predominantly a moment of questioning whether it is possible to do something other than be organized in a particular way, and simply asks the following,

Is it really so sad and dangerous to be fed up with seeing with your eyes, breathing with your lungs, swallowing with your mouth, talking with your tongue, thinking with your brain, having an anus and larynx, head and legs? Why not walk on your head, sing with your sinuses, see through your skin, breathe with your belly: the simple thing, the Entity, the full body …

In transcending the actual and ascending the BwO, the organism must be dismantled, or at least questioned. In seeking to actualize the potentials of the BwO, the whole body can reach towards its alternative formulations, albeit it will never be fully actualized, as Manning writes, “The body never fully actualizes. Or better said, the actual is never fully actual.” It is clear that the BwO must be thought of as the infinite range of bodily possibilities, but it is not a case of the organized body reaching towards potential, rather, the organized body must be thought of as immanent to the BwO, as Deleuze writes: “The actual is the complement or the product, the object actualization, which has nothing but the virtual as its subject. Actualization belongs to the virtual.” It is therefore a question of realizing that the organs can do other things and that they have potential to be actualized in different ways – you can declare war on them.

This experimentation is what Artaud had in mind for his Theatre of Cruelty. As Deleuze and Guattari note in one of their references to Artaud’s work: “On November 28, 1947, Artaud declares war on the organs: To be done with the Judgment of God, ‘for you can tie me up if you wish, but there is nothing more useless than an organ.’” On first reading, it initially appears that Deleuze and Guattari are suggesting that Artaud is saying that the organ itself is useless, but this is not the case. Artaud is not suggesting that the singularity of the organ itself is useless. Rather, it is deprived of its own vitality when it is subsumed within the organism, or when its potential is forced to actualization in

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accordance with representation. For Artaud, it is more a question of liberating the organ from the organism and the network of organization that can return an organ to itself: “Hence this full-scale invocation of cruelty and terror, its scope testing our entire vitality, confronting us with our potential.”21 The “cruelness” of the Theatre of Cruelty is a way of testing the organs and of experimenting with them and their connected spaces. Artaud therefore does not take the word cruelty as meaning something “sadistic or bloody.”22 It is not meant in the true sense of the word, or as an act calculated to cause physical or psychological harm, rather, the word is used to describe the kind of violence that is necessary to disrupt the organism and its accustomed functioning. It is more a method of radical destabilization which gives the organism the power to dismantle itself through doubting and questioning its use, or allowing a different range of potentials to be actualized. It is therefore clear that the body of the courtroom organism does not have to remain in any fixed formulation, indeed it must change, since its body bursts with an inherent potential to do so. While it can be argued that courtroom design progresses and improves over time,23 it is the basis that unfolds into changes in spatial praxes that must be further examined, and as will be argued in the following section, interrupted.

III. The Double (Act 2: Theatre of Power)

The courtroom is a theatre of power and ritual. The spatial arrangement is one of verticality, with an order of descending power. God is at the back of the courtroom, at the top, behind the ornate crest which proclaims “dieu et mon droit.”24 The judge is in front of the crest, judging from on high and in front of him are the advocates, who stand to deliver their submissions. At the back of the room, in the dock, is the defendant and to the right of him, is the jury, contained in their box. To the left is a very small space for the public to observe the court process.25 As I have already said, this arrangement has its foundations in social ordering and maintenance of organization for the purpose of the smooth functioning of the courtroom organism. However, this arrangement is also an assemblage as it is constructed of symbols, objects, positions and bodies. Yet the courtroom assemblage is the very antithesis to what Artaud had in mind in his Theatre of Cruelty. The courtroom as a performance of law is rigid in its use of conventions and if these conventions are not used and performed, then the performance of the trial founders and the law

22. Ibid., at p. 72.
23. Mulcahy, Legal Architecture, p. 34.
24. The crest is instantly recognizable as the law’s signifier, but also of law as perhaps an instrument of God. The phrase that is beneath the crest is in French. It most translates in English to “God and my right.” This does not hold any obvious meaning for those who use the court process and almost amounts to a presence that speaks to us in a language we do not understand from behind the judge’s chair.
25. This brief description summarizes the spatial composition of a typical old-style criminal courtroom (see Mulcahy, Legal Architecture, for a more detailed description and also diagrammatic representations of the space). Spatial practices in civil courtrooms differ, but there remains the same degree of separation and boundary maintenance.
founders: law is the user of conventions *par excellence*. In order to facilitate the deliverance of judgment, the legal body must use a language of caselaw, statutes and legal books, which must be read by organs such as lawyers, bailiffs, jurors and drafters, and the case must be heard in the space of the courtroom. This being said, it does not mean that the fabric of organization, or the courtroom assemblage, does not hold potential within it for a radical paradigm shift; for it too can become a *Theatre of Cruelty* through a Deleuzian conception of the “second” body of law,

... two bodies coexist, each of which reacts upon and enters into the other: a body of judgment, with its organization, its segments (continuity of offices) its differentiations (bailiffs, lawyers, judges ...), its hierarchies (classes of judges, or bureaucrats); but also a body of justice in which the segments are dissolved, the differentiations lost, the hierarchies thrown into confusion, a body which retains nothing but intensities that make up uncertain zones that traverse these zones at full speed and confront the powers in them ... on this anarchic body restored to itself.26

Artaud’s *Theatre of Cruelty* provides a way in which it is possible to access this immanent potential to rearrange and also confront and confuse the dynamic of power. Artaud’s vision can be conceived of as a surreal proposal for an eccentric form of dream-like theatre, that is, it concocts a distorted version of theatre, which mixes the traditional format with more than its fair share of the fantastic. Artaud’s project was to form new and bewildering mixtures which would comprise the audience and the traditional dramatic devices, which would be opened up and explored, and their vitality returned. He sought not only to create new ways of initiating theatrical performance, but also to radically rearrange the accepted arrangement of theatre. This new arrangement would draw out new and profound sensory connections between all of the bodies involved in the process, as Artaud writes, “Thus on the one hand we have the magnitude and scale of a show aimed at the whole anatomy, and on the other an intensive mustering of objects, gestures and signs used in a new spirit.”27 Artaud conceives of a new way of sensing through rearrangement, or accessing the potential within the theatre’s BwO.

Artaud also accesses a bodily potential which can be actualized through a Deleuzian assemblage. For Deleuze, in assemblages you find: “states of things, bodies, various combinations of bodies, hodgepodges; but you also find utterances, modes of expression, and whole regimes of signs.”28 So an assemblage can be a mixture of an infinite array of bodies and things, and these mixtures are always with signs. There is never an assemblage that comprises one but not the other. Thus, Artaud’s proposal is for an assemblage of both the traditional “signs” of theatre, such as the stage, the audience, costume, and the play itself, but also recognition that there are material elements. But from where can the

momentum that generates rearrangements arise, or rather, how is it possible to access this moment of realignment in an organism that is so rigid, and apparently un-interruptible such as the courtroom?

I have said that an assemblage is a collection of bodies which are heterogeneous in nature, that is, it can be collections of bodies, objects and signs, which seem to move together. But what is it that connects these elements of an assemblage? Deleuze goes on to consider how the elements of an assemblage interact: “first and foremost what keeps very heterogeneous elements together: e.g. a sound, a gesture, a position, etc., both natural and artificial elements.” What connects an assemblage is therefore the assemblage itself. It is the materiality of the connection between the elements, or the consistency of the connection. The consistency is the content of the mixture between each element when the particles of the constituents congeal. It is sounds, gestures, positions, texture, movement and so on. These are simultaneously the material consequences of the interaction of the elements, that which connects them and that which form the dynamic of the assemblage itself. These movements and sounds that are generated can also be conceived of as affects. The elements that constitute an assemblage are bound, but also separated and propelled in their movement through affectations generated by their presence; any given element exists as part of an assemblage compiled of human and non-human processes.

Within the courtroom, each part of the space throbs with the affect of power. The wood that is shaped into panels that form its walls becomes wood of power, the barriers between the separate zones of the space are barriers to maintain the hierarchy of power, and the bodies that enter the courtroom, such as the barristers, judges, the defendant and the public, form an assemblage with elements of the space. The consistency of the connection between these bodies and the space itself take on a specific quality. The position of these bodies is within the allocated zones and bodies stringently follow the hierarchical order of the space, which demonstrates a connection of power to the spatial zones and produces movements which attune to this pattern. Movement is on a slow trajectory and solely vertical plane: the court rises, the court sits. Gestures are completely absent from the courtroom, hands must be kept by your side. The sounds these bodies make are not groans and screams, but articulations only through law’s language: statutes, cases and courtroom etiquette. You may only speak if it is your turn and if you are citing supporting authority. The affect that maintains this assemblage is not sensual or comfortable, but one of power. This affect that is produced by the courtroom is one that restricts bodies, while also allowing a sense of recognition, that is, bodies are almost comforted by the fact that they are in the presence of the law, while paradoxically experiencing profound discomfort. This legally appropriated affect is

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29. Ibid., at p. 179.
31. Discomfort in the courtroom can be experienced on a physical level, through the restrictions on movement and expression, the hardness of courtroom seating, the coldness of the room. It can also be felt emotionally, especially as a victim or defendant who must endure the physical discomfort as well as the trauma induced by the process itself.
one that is compelled towards and maintains the subjectivities inscribed on bodies that experience the room, and in this sense, it is an experience of subjectivity, rather than experience of true affect. While movement, sound and gestures can be conceived of as affects, it can be argued that affects do not require a subject in order to materialize.\footnote{Blackman, \textit{Immaterial Bodies}, p. 16.} This conception of affect as impersonal is important since it creates a space for interruption, or a way of identifying the moment from which the \textit{embodied} rearrangement that Artaud calls for might flow.

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\textbf{Interruption (affects)}

Artaud considered the \textit{Theatre of Cruelty} as the necessary means by which the body can regain its sensory capability – \textit{repeated jading of our organs calls for sudden shocks}.\footnote{Artaud, \textit{The Theatre and its Double}, p. 62.} Artaud wanted the audience, the performers, directors and so on to be completely immersed in the sensory milieu of the theatre. He wanted the theatre to cease to be personal, and instead be capable of assimilating the transformative power of affect. He wanted theatre to fully appeal to the sensory vitality of bodies, as Artaud writes, “Infused with the idea that the masses think with their senses first ... The \textit{Theatre of Cruelty} proposes to resort to mass theatre, thereby rediscovering a little of the poetry in the ferment of great agitated crowds hurled against one another, sensations only too rare nowadays ...\textsuperscript{34}”\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, at p. 60.} In order to achieve this “great sensation” he proposed something quite alien to the courtroom’s theatre of power. He sought a sensory alliance between the human participants, the space and its excess as well as its objects. He had in mind a kind of metaphysics that would drive every element of the assemblage, creating a “thrilling equation between Man, Society, Nature and Objects.”\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, at p. 64.} His proposal was a de-actualization of subjectivity, a complete exposure to the potentially impersonal power of affect where “every show would contain physical, objective elements perceptible to all.”\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, at p. 66.} The power of affect, which can be thought of as consistency in binding and separating, through Artaud also becomes profoundly transformative.

This transformative power is in line with a conception of affect as a possible range of experience and sensual responses, as Manning writes: “Affect … erupts in bursts, expressing itself through dephasings that produce not discrete parts but new processes …”\footnote{Manning, “Always More than One,” 122.} Artaud’s vision is open to the true disruptive power of affect, that is, affect that produces new arrangements, where the process itself is less concerned with the affirmation of subjectivities. Having identified the point where the productive disruption might occur within the courtroom (that is, everywhere) how would the space look if the trajectory of this disruption is followed; how can the space be rearranged as a result if we follow this interruption?

34. \textit{Ibid.}, at p. 60.
35. \textit{Ibid.}, at p. 64.
36. \textit{Ibid.}, at p. 66.
IV. The Double (Act 3: Revolving Rooms)

As I mentioned previously, the courtroom is a space of wooden panels, vertiginous spatial levels and imposing grandeur. This is the kind of space that occupies the mainstream imaginary and represents the recognizable surface of the courtroom. What does not come to mind however, are the hidden depths of the space which I refer to here in two separate ways. First, I have in mind the judge’s chambers, which extend back from the judges chair on the bench. Behind the bench is often a network of corridors which house each judge’s private office and chambers. It also comprises a large room with a large dining table, around which the judges will sit together and share lunch, discuss cases and make arrangements for their weekend. I also have in mind the vast networks of corridors that connect each of the separate spatial zones in the courtroom space, as well as the corridors between each courtroom within the building. The corridors often contain seating and are the place where barristers, solicitors and clients will discuss cases, and where the claimant and the defendant might talk (or fight). There are also cafeterias (for advocates only), robing rooms (for male/female advocates) and cells (where solicitors and advocates are permitted to visit their client if he is being held in custody). These are the additional spaces of the courtroom, the hidden depths and the unfolding space of the courtroom. They are present within the process and therefore within the room, but also hidden from view.

Second, I refer to different types of courtroom. I have had the opportunity of experiencing many of them, such as Greater London magistrates’ courts, crown courts in the center of London, the Old Bailey, The Royal Courts of Justice, as well as county courts all over the country. Each and every one is different, but of particular interest here, is the kind of modern courtroom that Hansen identifies, which are different since when you enter them, you would not recognize them as courtrooms. There could be just a similarly segregated space but with a lighter seeming interior, or there could be something entirely different – just a table around which the judge, the advocates and their clients sit and deal with the case. This is also a “hidden” courtroom, since it is largely absent from courtroom discourse, but also present as a space of adjudication for many court users. In this section, I will be using these two angles to consider how the courtroom might be able to utilize and surface these depths in order to construct a more sensory courtroom.

38. This is something I have personally experienced through “marshaling” in July 2011 at Blackfriars Crown Court. This is a period of a week spent with a Judge, where I accompanied him throughout the day, both beside him on the bench in court, and in his chambers.

39. This is experience I have gained through working in law firms as a case-worker and advocate from 2003–2009, as well as various shadowing placements with barristers from 2009–2011.

40. See modern courtroom arrangements discussed by Hanson, “The Architecture of Justice” and Mulcahy, Legal Architecture. In addition, although not considered in this article, alternative spatial practices are present within spaces used for mediation and arbitration. These processes are a less formal way of resolving disputes, yet they are still within the judicial/legal system. They could also be an interesting avenue of exploration in reforming spatial practices. This is because the process itself is generally considered to be more relaxed in nature, which means the spatial practices are constructed around a less formal process. This also alludes to a further rupture within the system itself.
Artaud was critical of spatial conventions and divisions, preferring instead to experiment with the space in order to create diverse sensory experiences. His project was to encourage experience of space itself and to expose the audience to the productive, stimulating and intoxicating qualities of space. His first step was to remove the boundaries between the stage and the auditorium, “we intend to do away with stage and auditorium, replacing them with a kind of single, undivided locale without any partitions of any kind and this will become the very scene of the action.”41 In doing so, he has in mind a collapsing of not only the spatial divisions, but also of re-establishing a connection between the audience and the actors. He goes on to write that, “Direct contact will be established between the audience and the show, between actors and audience …”42 Artaud is acutely aware of the affect that spatial boundaries have in dividing bodies, and how this division can impede upon the genuinely sensory experience of other bodies and the show itself. He also brings to our attention that space has the power to either maintain this separation between bodies, or to open potential for different ways of experiencing the theatrical process. Artaud almost submits entirely to space and its ability to shape the unfolding of his Theatre of Cruelty. There is a kind of abandon that comes through in his text which is indicative of a profound appreciation of the productive qualities of space, “the very fact that the audience is seated in the centre of the action, is encircled and furrowed by it. This encirclement comes from the shape of the house itself.”43 Artaud’s space is a space of unfolding, but it is a space that unfolds the action through its own productive capacity. The challenge for courtroom spatial praxes is therefore to recognize the affect the space has on the bodies that must use it, in the same way that Artaud was able.

For Deleuze and Guattari, one modality of understanding space is through its dual components: “smooth and striated.” Smooth and striated are distinct forms of space, yet they exist together, and so are not to be considered a dualism: “smooth space is constantly being translated, transversed into a striated space; striated space is constantly being reversed, returned to a smooth space.”44 Yet there is a subtle distinction between the two, as Deleuze and Guattari go on to explain: “in striated space, lines or trajectories are subordinated to points: one goes from one point to another. In the smooth, it is the opposite: the points are subordinated to the trajectory.”45 There is a kind of cycle with space and it is possible to draw an analogy with the theatre at this point. The striated can be seen as the spatial conventions: the stage, the auditorium, the bar and the entrance hall and it is not just the spatial zones themselves that can be conceived as striated, but also the divisions that are necessary to maintain the zones. That is not to say there are not smooth elements within the traditional formulation of theatre – it is just that they are subsumed within the striated in a particular way.

The most effective way to understand the mixture in this context is through Deleuze and Guattari’s application of smooth and striated to sensory experiences of space.

42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 524.
45. Ibid., at p. 528.
Deleuze and Guattari explain that striated space is: “a more optical space – although the eye in turn is not the only organ to have this capacity.”46 Striated space can be seen as the obvious and surface dimensions of space, that is, space without its depths, or potential for unfolding. It is directly perceptible space, not only the obviously visual aspects, but also obvious perception through other sensory organs. It is the sight of the stage and auditorium and acknowledgement of the boundaries. It is also the sound of the accepted linguistic conventions (and moments of silence)47 as well as the seats within the auditorium which you must sit on, and the expected taste of champagne in the theatre bar. Yet it remains possible to situate an interruption within the striated/smooth cycle of space, since it remains intact and potentially disruptive prior to the incorporeal frontier of the striated.

—Interruption (smooth spaces)

Striated perceptions of the space are not without their smoothness, “Smooth is both the object of a close vision par excellence and an element of haptic space (which may be as much visual or auditory as tactile).”48 The smoothness is therefore the sensory excess; it is the softness and rough texture of the seats, the square smoothness of your ticket, the cold touch of your champagne glass and the bubbles that tickle the back of your throat. It is the hardness of the wooden paneled walls in the courtroom, the transparent coldness of the glass that prevents the defendant’s movement outside of the dock, and the steeliness of his cuffs. Artaud’s project was to situate his form of theatre within a sensory and smooth terrain, he wanted to harness the productivity of the smooth and allow it to shape the performance, “we advocate a revolving show, which, instead of making stage and auditorium two closed worlds without any possible communication between them, will extend its visual and oral outbursts over the whole mass of spectators.”49 He sought to open the channels of striation and allow the channels themselves to be shaped through sensory experience and through dissolution of spatial boundaries. But he also sought to “free up” space so it could shape the show for itself, “spatial, thundering images replete with sound also speak.”50 Artaud’s usage of space is symptomatic of his appreciation of the power of smooth space as a space of affect, since he attempts to extract the affective properties of space and allow them to hold a greater power than the conventions and divisive practices that traditionally mold it.

The properties that Artaud sought to extract are precisely those which derive from smooth space, since the smooth is “occupied by intensities, wind and noise, forces, and sonorous and tactile qualities, as in the desert, steppe, or ice. The creaking of ice and the

46. Ibid., at p. 544.
47. The moments of prolonged silence in the process are as much part of the language of the law as what is spoken. There may be silence while a page in a bundle of papers is found, while a witness recollects and during the wait for the judge to enter the room.
50. Ibid., at p. 62.
song of the sands.” These “properties” must also be thought of as affects, in the sense that occupation of smooth space forces attunement to the physical properties of space, as opposed to the measured observation that striated space induces. Henriques identifies this very connection, where he argues that the hapticity of space is experienced only through affect:

affect is expressed rhythmically – through relationships, reciprocations, resonances, syncopations and harmonies. Affect is transmitted in the way wave dynamics are propagated through a particular medium – which may be corporeal, or material, or sociocultural.

It is therefore clear that in order to experience the potentially sensual affects of space, bodies must be attuned to these affects, that is, these bodies must be able to listen (both to the space and to other bodies). In the context of the courtroom, the ability to listen, to be open, is inhibited by the will of the law to assert subjectivities and construct an encounter with the law that establishes its power. Yet there are spaces that are connected with the courtroom and present within it that have the potential to allow for this productive attunement. Through this Artaudian/Deleuzian lens, it is possible to conceive of the smooth spaces of the courtroom as generative of interruptions, since although they are already present and immanent to the organism, smooth space “possesses a greater power of deterritorialization than the striated.”

Although Artaud might characterize the space of the courtroom as a space of surface, it is clear that it also extends into depth, there is only one surface to the room; this surface of depth. The courtroom necessitates a regimented and regulated performance, as there is a prescribed order in which each party can speak and from where they can speak. Movement is also restricted in this way as each actor within the court cannot move outside of their zone, once they are in it and the process has begun. The texture of this experience is striated, as the courtroom itself is only the surface of perception. Yet the space does unfold through hidden rooms and passages that are inextricably connected to the courtroom itself. The judge might have discussed a case with his colleagues in the lunch room, which might influence his decision or the way he conducts the court process. Similarly, the advocates will have discussed a case with their client in the private interview rooms available in the court building. They will also have discussed the case with opposing counsel in the corridors that surround the courtroom. The jury will also carry out their deliberations in a small room outside of the main courtroom, which will fundamentally influence the outcome of the case. The courtroom appears as a representative space, which is problematic, as Harris suggests, it “remains caught in the problem of representation – it represents rather than embodies the texture of … smooth space.” Yet

The smooth elements of the space are not missing, but rather they are occupied, appropriated by the “diabolical powers of organization.” The space of the courtroom makes explicit the Deleuzian continuum and productive tension of the cycle of space. Whereas Artaud would return the space to the body, it is clear that this must be in recognition that there is an act of surfacing to follow. The challenge for courtroom design is therefore whether it can follow the trajectory of the interruptions that emanate from the corporeal depths of the surface.

As I mentioned previously, some of the recently built county courts have a space that is all on one level, with some courtrooms using a kind of “roundtable” arrangement. Harbinger writes that, “A new courtroom is not beyond imagining” and proposes a new literally theatrical court. His proposal does not quite reach the same sensory depths as Artaud’s Theatre of Cruelty, nonetheless, his proposal is an intriguing one, with his entire (and often bizarre) proposal being based on a circular model. He begins by saying that the circle is a perfect arrangement as each and every person is near to each other, because it is symmetrical and because there are no “irrelevant corners.” He is of the opinion that the traditional spatial arrangement of the courtroom tends to separate and has the effect of segregation, when the real aim is for all the participants within the process to act as one body, and even proposes that the jury should be seated around a table while in the courtroom. Yet some of Harbinger’s suggestions may be too much, even for Artaud. He suggests that the jury’s area should be at the mercy of a turntable, which is exercisable by the judge at the push of a button, should he wish them to not hear the proceedings. This is convenient of course, but may depart from Artaud’s project of inclusivity and the dissolution of hierarchical boundaries. The main point that arises in respect to Harbinger’s text is that a circular basis for courtroom spatial praxes might have the effect of breaking the barriers between the component parts of the organism, which is a point that some modern court architects may have tried to realize in contemporary court design. This approach to the spatial design of the room produces a creative line of flight, one which is able to generate ways of reformulating the space in ways which are attentive to the affects of space. The surface of the space reaches far deeper than just the spatial design and extends into the physical properties of the space. The surface incorporates matter which is also organized, but as I will show, can also interrupt.

V. The Double (Act 4: Screens of Matter)

I have mentioned previously that the courtroom enfolds a hidden depth to its space, since the divisions and actor-specific zones are in part a product of social devices, such as

56. See Hanson “The Architecture of Justice.”
58. Ibid., at 68.
59. Ibid., at 69.
60. Ibid., at 70.
61. See Hanson, “The Architecture of Justice.”
social hierarchical orderings and gender/class divides. There is also a desire to assert the authority of law through the creation of a spectacle of justice as well as a perceived need to contain a volatile public. These social and state forces have influenced the spatial practices utilized by the courtroom, but not only do these forces feed into spatial practices which determine the construction and divisions within the room itself, they also contribute to the formation of courtroom objects as elements of the space which produce the affects of power mentioned above. If these forces were instead replaced by the desire to create a Theatre of Cruelty as opposed to a theatre of power, the experience would have the potential to become a more radically sensory experience, as well as more welcoming to court users. If the courtroom architect designs the space in full recognition of the formative power that bursts from matter, together with a commensurate desire to allow her practice to be shaped by the underlying sensibility of matter, there becomes a creative materiality; or a genuine Deleuzian agencement, as Bennett describes:

Instead of a formative power detachable from matter, artisans (and mechanics, cooks, builders, cleaners, and anyone else intimate with things) encounter a creative materiality with incipient tendencies and propensities, which are variably enacted depending on other forces, affects, or bodies with which they come into close contact.

Whether the courtroom is designed in the spirit of this “creative materiality” is doubtful. To comprehensively and persuasively answer this question would require consideration of complex and detailed ontological arguments which I cannot add to here, but what is clear is that recognition of the formative power of matter on the space of the courtroom becomes increasingly more important as it becomes increasingly evident.

Matter is of course that which forms the space, but it is far from a quiet, merely manipulated presence. It has come to profoundly influence both the organization of the space, as well as courtroom processes. Through modern court practices such as the use of video links, conference call facilities and also screens to maintain divisions between vulnerable witnesses and defendants, matter has increasingly become an accepted presence. Not only is it an accepted presence, but it can be seen as explicitly shaping both spatial practices and the court process itself. De Sario writes that the increasing use of technology has fundamentally affected the evidence process. It has even changed the outcome of cases, as lawyers who successfully wield devices such as PowerPoint in their presentation of evidence are more likely to encounter a more responsive and ultimately swayable jury. What must be noted here is that De Sario writes regarding American

63. Ibid., at pp. 51–58.
courtrooms and it seems from her study that the courtroom (at least in her geographical area of practice) is much more ready to accept the invasion of technological matter. It is also evident from her work that such a presence tends to improve the sensory experience of those involved in the court process.\textsuperscript{67} It seems that there is something that emerges in the growing invasion of technological matter that follows the creative trajectory of Artaud’s vision of theatre, which also tends to alleviate the suffering of certain bodies. Mulcahy notes this in relation to video links:

\ldots the giving of evidence by live link seriously disrupts traditional notions of the trial, but it could be argued that there is general merit in disrupting the traditional space-place dynamic in adversarial systems. Perhaps the mundane is preferable to the fear-inducing courtroom and more likely to reflect contemporary aspirations to “accessible” justice.\textsuperscript{68}

What Mulcahy has identified here is important to this text. The acceptance of matter within the courtroom is unavoidable, as well as crucial if courtrooms are to become less threatening spaces. Yet the argument is more complex than this, since with the acceptance of the invasion of matter comes disruptions to the process which change it fundamentally from within. In accordance with material momentum and confederacy, screens of matter are added and erected between vulnerable witnesses and defendants and evidence can be given by video link if a witness is too scared or young to be present in court. Yet since the basic process of the trial remains unchanged, problematic perceptions are produced as a result of this misalignment between the process and material. If a witness appears to be too scared that she cannot even look the defendant in the eye, this will influence our perceptions of the defendant’s nature and credibility; not only this, but it becomes clear that the presumption of innocence is not spatially (nor materially) emplaced.\textsuperscript{69} It is at this point that the notion of the interruption becomes

\textit{–Interrupton (the imperceptible)}

more important than ever. The reader will recall that Artaud’s project is a profoundly sensory one, as well as material, and he believed that objects are as important as language in shaping the experience of the performance. Artaud writes, “Puppets, huge masks, objects of strange proportions appear by the same right as verbal imagery.”\textsuperscript{70} He also wanted to liberate matter, and allow it to make its own connection with the audience; he wanted the audience to use their senses to experience objects, as opposed to experiencing only their surface: “all objects requiring stereotyped physical representation will be discarded or disguised.”\textsuperscript{71} Artaud was able to see the material vitality in every element of the performance, including lighting, he writes: “The particular action of light on the mind comes into play, we must discover oscillating light effects, new ways of

\textsuperscript{67} See De Sario, “Merging Technology with Justice.”
\textsuperscript{68} Mulcahy, \textit{Legal Architecture}, p. 173.
\textsuperscript{69} \textit{Ibid.}, at pp. 59–78.
\textsuperscript{70} Artaud, \textit{Theatre and its Double}, p. 69.
\textsuperscript{71} \textit{Id}. 
diffusing lighting in waves, sheet lighting like a flight of fire arrows.”’’

His project was to encourage genuinely sensory perception of every element of the performance, that is, it must be an experience of the space, and everything that builds it, but there is more at stake here than just a more sensual experience. What Artaud was able to recognize was that human experience is not only through human processes, but one that is profoundly influenced by non-human elements; his project proposes an interruption, and as I will suggest, a becoming-imperceptible.

Having said earlier that matter is far from an imperceptible presence, it remains so in the sense that it escapes us unnoticed, until it is present in the Artaudian sense. But to radically make sensible the matter of the process of the courtroom in the manner that Artaud suggests, is a little too much and a little too radical for the courtroom. In trying to be so far below the surface in the corporeal, material depths, Artaud occupies the line that is the threshold, being perceived: he is too loud. Instead, the interruption must be imperceptible, a power which is already within the matter to which Artaud seeks to give a voice. While it would seem counter-intuitive in this context to argue for material imperceptibility, this is precisely where the movement occurs, as Deleuze and Guattari explain, “Everything becomes imperceptible, everything is becoming-imperceptible on the plane of consistency, which is nevertheless precisely where the imperceptible is heard.”

Simply put, when the Artaudian bodies scream, they are perceived since they are so loud. Yet this does not help since they are straight-away silenced; instead, the art is to allow the gasp to materialize, but to avert the “eagle’s eye.” The potential movement and rearrangements as a result are within this gasp waiting to burst; this perceptible imperceptible gasp is just like movement, which cannot be perceived.

This is the value of the “material” interruption. We did not notice matter creeping up on us, it became part of the process as we did not see it there, as it was always there, as part of us. It was (and is) imperceptible, yet it moves and materializes. Authors such as Braidotti encourage us to recognize that we can no longer think of ourselves as exclusively human, she writes, “Not all of us can say, with any degree of certainty, that we have always been human, or that we are only that.” It follows that the courtroom is experienced by bodies as abstract machines, that is, the self must be conceived of as primordially receptive to its environment, or rather, as part of it. The experience of the courtroom is felt inside the body of the human, but also brought about by matter that it encounters, that is, the experience of the space is a complex web of affective exchanges. It is not that human bodies that are within the courtroom itself are simply blank canvasses that lay open to be affected by matter, nor is it the case that matter is simply a terrain to be manipulated by human bodies. Matter has interrupted the process.

72. Ibid., at p. 67.
73. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 278.
74. Ibid., at p. 310.
75. Ibid., at XI.
78. See Blackman, Immaterial Bodies, p. xi of the preface where the author reminds us of the need to be cautious in creating “false dichotomies” between mind and matter by conceiving of affect as non-intentional.
By Brooks

While matter screams and gurgles and effervesces on the threshold of perception, we do not necessarily hear it (since it is part of us). Its movement eludes us, yet it has interrupted us, and we are left with no choice but to rethink processes within the courtroom as materially embedded.

—Interruption that interrupts

And so now it has come, the interruption that it is not possible to see, the (until now) imperceptible gasp, with movement always immanent, which must be thought of as rooted within bodies that scream, matter that buzzes with potential and affects that arise. The interruptions I have set out have been subtle; it could be argued that they are simply presences around which the courtroom might be re-organized. There has been no vociferous interruption, one which calls the process to a halt to allow a moment of reflection; no one has crossed a spatial boundary, spoken when they are not supposed to, nor articulated their body in a way that offends the organism. At this point it therefore becomes necessary to reflect on the act of interrupting and contrast an imperceptible or sustainable interruption with traditional courtroom interruptions. In order to assist in this reflection, I recount here a brief summary of a case so troubled by interruptions that it became a case solely about interruptions; the US case of the “Chicago Seven.”

Against the background of the 1968 “Festival of Life” which was largely a protest against the Vietnam War aimed towards the Democratic National Convention, delegates of which were arriving in Chicago, David Dellinger and seven others were indicted for public order offenses. This case, presided over by Judge Julius Hoffman, was interrupted by 159 occasions of criminal contempt, which “ranged from minor acts of disrespect (such as not standing for the judge) to playful acts (such as baring rib cages or blowing kisses to the jury) to insulting or questioning the integrity of the court (‘liar,’ ‘hypocrite,’ and ‘fascist dog’).” Other acts included eating in court, making faces, reading newspapers, sleeping in court and generally making a mess of the defense area by leaving food wrappers lying around, and even a package of marijuana. At one stage, one of the defendants, Bobby Seale, outraged the Judge to the extent that he ordered Seale to be bound and gagged, and eventually, removed from the case altogether. When it came to sentencing the defendants, each one was allowed to make a statement to the

79. See note 68 above.
80. The trial initially involved eight defendants, although one of them, Bobby Seale, was removed early on from the case by Judge Hoffman for contempt. See also Linder’s account of the trial, which includes links to transcripts of the case: http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/Chicago7/Account.html (accessed 29 December 2013).
83. Id.
court prior to the Judge’s decision, and one statement in particular, is important for the following discussion regarding interruptions; Jerry Rubin offered the Judge a copy of his book inscribed with the following: “Julius, you radicalized more young people than we ever could.”

The question of the value of the interruption in a courtroom setting becomes important, since it is clear that the legal process cannot sustain itself when interrupted to the extent Judge Hoffman experienced in the case of the Chicago Seven. So what is an interruption, and what value does it hold? The interruption can be thought of as an act of deterritorialization, or a line of flight that transforms the multiplicity from which it originates, and connects it to another, as Deleuze and Guattari explain: “Multiplicities are defined by the outside: by the abstract line, the line of flight or deterritorialization according to which they change in nature and connect with other multiplicities.”

Simply put, the moment where an interruption to any given process occurs can realign this process, or bring it into connection with another. Unless, that is, the process is not rearranged as a result of that which generates the line of flight, as Deleuze and Guattari go on to explain: “The line of flight marks: the reality of a finite number of dimensions that the multiplicity effectively fills; the impossibility of a supplementary dimension, unless the multiplicity is transformed by the line of flight …” The potential for the courtroom to rearrange itself, to transcend its actuality and ascend its Body without Organs (as is suggested in the opening sections of this text) depends on its ability to move with an interruption, or rather, to follow the line of flight that emerges as a result of it. In instances such as the Chicago Seven, the horizon of the courtroom process, the seeming impossibility of any change in the process or the space, becomes apparent with each interruption and the cry of Judge Hoffman to return the room to order. Each returning to order brings disorder back to the room, brings another interruption that interrupts only to be forcibly returned to the process – you radicalized us.

The way in which to capitalize on the value of the interruption is to sustain it, but also to make it sustainable, such that it becomes the process, so that it no longer interrupts. In such a way, the interruption becomes slow enough, subtle enough to evade the collapse of the process, to trick it into realignment. With this in mind, it is hoped that this mixed reading of the courtroom through Artaud and Deleuze becomes-imperceptible – a sustainable interruption. The beauty of this interruption is that it does not.

84. Id.
86. Ibid., at p. 10 (my emphasis).